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Abstract 
 
We can expand our understanding of the politics of global networks and how they 
relate to the United Nations, by closely examining the concept of a network. There 
is a long-established International Relations literature focusing on the more 
institutionalised, international non-governmental organisations. Keck and Sikkink 
have drawn on the Sociology literature covering social movements in global politics 
to discuss transnational advocacy networks. It is also necessary to distinguish a 
third major category: governance networks. They operate to enhance the 
participation rights of NGOs in intergovernmental organisations. Differences in 
membership and functions of the two types of networks can be clearly specified 
analytically, but real-world networks may have some features from each ideal-type. 
However, if the distinction between them is not understood and respected by those 
participating in a network, there can be major political conflicts that threaten the 
legitimacy of the network. Three case-studies – on the NGO Steering Committee at 
the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, on the World Conference 
Against Racism and on the World Summit on Sustainable Development – are used 
to demonstrate how crises can arise when the fundamental contradictions between 
engaging in collective advocacy and adopting a governance role are not 
recognised. 
 
 
 
This paper is a substantially revised version of a paper presented at the American Sociological 
Association 102nd Annual Meeting, New York, August 2007. The British government’s Department 
for International Development provided a research grant that made it possible to attend sessions of 
the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, the Council of the Global Environment Facility 
and the IMF, World Bank Spring Meetings in 2001 and 2002. 
 
 
 
Introduction: What is a Non-Governmental Organisation? 
This paper will use the following definition.  
A non-governmental organisation is any organisation that has, or is 
eligible to have, consultative status with the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations.  
Thus, the question, what is an NGO, becomes what are the requirements for a 
group to be recognised by the UN. Because consultative status is granted almost 
automatically to the overwhelming majority of groups that apply to the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), this is a broad definition. The groups may vary in 
size from mass organisations that mobilise large segments of civil society to small 
numbers of people. They may speak on behalf of the poor and the oppressed or 
they may represent privileged élites. They may engage in advocacy; run 
operational programmes; provide a great variety of public services; promote and 
sustain many types of social, economic and political co-operation; or raise funds for 
other organisations to spend. They may perform these activities for part of society 
or for society as a whole. They are not limited to groups concerned with women’s 
rights, general human rights, the environment, development, peace or other 
progressive causes. Their values may be of any type: whether progressive, 
conventional or reactionary; religious or secular; nationalist or cosmopolitan. They 
may be in favour of globalisation or part of the anti-globalisation movement. They 
are not different from, but part of, social movements.1 If they seek change, their 
strategies may be radical or reformist. They can act as insider or outsider groups. 
They may be wholly or partially government funded or refuse to accept government 
funds. They may be established by governments, collaborate to varying degrees 
with governments or be  in conflict with some or all governments. Similarly, they 
may be established by commercial interests, collaborate with business or totally 
reject the capitalist system. Most groups are seen, by most others, as being 
legitimate social and political actors. However, even when we exclude criminal 
groups, such as the mafia or terrorists, some of the NGOs at the UN are not 
regarded as legitimate by other NGOs. They may be from the North, from transition 
societies or from the South. Their geographical scope may be global, regional, 
national or local. They establish the relationships that give concrete reality to civil 
                                                 
1 This point is implicitly recognised by some sociologists, when they refer to “transnational social movement 
organisations” as a sub-set of international NGOs. See Jackie Smith, “Building Bridges or Building Walls? 
Explaining Regionalization Among Transnational Social Movement Organizations”, Mobilization: An 
International Quarterly, Vol. 10, 2005, pp. 251-69, or J. Smith, R. Pagnucco, and W. Romeril, 
“Transnational Social Movement Organisations in the Global Political Arena“, Voluntas: International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 1994, Volume 5, pp. 121-54. 
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society. Some analysts may wish to define certain civil society groups, notably faith 
communities and trade unions, as being separate from the world of NGOs, but, for 
the purposes of studying global politics and diplomacy, there is no logical basis for 
making such distinctions. There can be no generally agreed definition of a “true” 
NGO that excludes other groups. There is no such thing as a typical NGO. The 
only exclusions are those that distinguish the three sectors: governments, markets 
and civil society. NGOs are any organised groups of people that are not direct 
agents of individual governments, not pursuing criminal activities, not engaged in 
violent activities and not primarily established for profit-making purposes.2 
Types of Global NGO Networks 
The concept of a network is popular now in the study of global politics among both 
academics and NGO activists, but it is rarely defined by those who use it. One 
strand of thought about the concept has been rather formal scientific work in 
sociology on social network analysis, which is comparable to its use in business 
studies, communications theory and computing. Using this approach, a network is 
defined as a set of channels along which there are flows of materials, people, 
energy, finance or data between nodes that receive, process or further transmit the 
flows.3 A social network is then a network in which the nodes are people or 
organisations and the flows are predominantly information, including arguments 
about values. A social network may also transmit finance or even on occasions 
energy, materials or people. This formal scientific approach lies behind the 
foremost current sociological work on networks, by Manual Castells, which covers 
the “information age”, the “networked society” and the power of new identities 
mobilised by the networks of social change that are the new social movements.4 
Castells tends to be over-impressed by contemporary technology, exaggerating the 
significance of the speed of communications and elaborating nebulous concepts, 
such as “timeless time”.5 A much richer, more sophisticated, well researched body 
of sociological work on social movements started in the 1960s with questions 
concerning the processes by which individuals come to join movements. From the 
                                                 
2  Both this definition and the paragraph discussing it are taken from the conclusion to Chapter 1 of 
P. Willetts, Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics, (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 
2011).  
3  This is the current author’s own definition, derived from a background in Systems Science. The definition 
implies a network is synonymous with a system. 
4 See the three-volume work, by M. Castells, The Information Age. Economy, Society and Culture, 
particularly Volume I, The Rise of the Network Society, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, second ed., 2000), 
and Volume II, The Power of Identity, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997). For the influence of the 
scientific language, note Castells’ definition, “A network is a set of interconnected nodes”, in Vol. I, p. 501. 
5 Castells, Vol. I, Chp. 7.   
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1980s, the concept of networks became an important component of social 
movement theory, to explain why specific individuals were recruited into collective 
action and how movements mobilise resources.6 However, this literature seems to 
take the concept of a network for granted and not discuss how it might be defined. 
The obvious response is to consider whether a definition from the formal scientific 
approach can be used in conjunction with the social movements literature.  
 The two approaches may be treated as being compatible, provided two related 
caveats are noted. Firstly, the abstract definition of a network is of such generality 
that it could cover a linear chain or a hierarchy. On the other hand, the concept of a 
network is attractive, particularly to anarchists, feminists and many on the left, each 
for their own rather different reasons, precisely because it is seen as offering an 
alternative, non-hierarchical model for organising collective action. This distinction 
between hierarchies and networks is artificial and of no practical value. While there 
are some relatively hierarchical organisations, such as prisons, armies and 
businesses that emphasise line-management, the hierarchy only applies to formal 
decision-making authority. Interactions in the prison canteen, in the army officers’ 
mess or around the company photocopier cut across the formal hierarchy. Equally, 
no unstructured network will function without some organisational focus, providing 
leadership, even if the leadership is unacknowledged. As an important feminist, Jo 
Freeman, has argued, there is no such thing as a structureless group.7 
Organisations and networks have varying degrees of hierarchy. All have some 
mixture of vertical and horizontal communications. Similarly in the scientific work on 
networks, there is little interest in pure hierarchies. The emphasis is on analysing 
the systemic properties of networks through identification of feedback processes 
that generate complexity and unpredictability in how flows move or what their 
impact might be. As feedback, by definition cannot arise without the possibility of 
flows returning to the point where change has been initiated and usually occurring 
through multiple paths, a hierarchy is not an example of a complex network.8 Thus, 
despite the hypothetical possibility of pure hierarchies being contrasted with 
unstructured networks, neither pure form exists in the real-world of global civil 
                                                 
6  For a thorough review of networks in social movement theory, see D. della Porta and M. Diani, Social 
Movements. An Introduction, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999). Nominally, Castells draws on the social 
movements literature, but it is not very evident in his work. 
7  The author is grateful to Kevin Gillan for pointing me to Jo Freeman, “The Tyranny of Structurelessness”, 
Berkeley Journal of Sociology,- Vol. 17, 1972-73,  pp. 151–165. There is an interesting note on the history 
of this article and an amended version of the text, at www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm.  
8  A formal definition of a non-hierarchical network is of a network containing at least three nodes, with an 
average of two or more channels connecting to each node and at least one set of connections generating 
a feedback process. 
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society. The concept of a network applies to systems of relationships that have 
both some top-down structure and some paths for feedback. 
 Secondly, a definition of a social network based on flows of information can be 
used to cover an institution. For Castells that seems to be acceptable, when he 
cites the European Union as a political network.9 For other writers on social 
movements, a network clearly is taken as being a non-institutionalised set of 
relationships. Again, attempting concrete application of the concepts shows it is 
difficult to draw a clear line between them. Chetley characterised the International 
Baby Foods Action Network, when it was formed in October 1979, “as an ‘illusion’, 
in the sense that it had no fundamental organisation, no officials, no formal 
membership. It both existed and did not exist at the same time.”10 Did it cease to 
be a network and become an institution when a few years later it had raised a small 
budget, organised training seminars, published a regular IBFAN News and 
established a formal listed of affiliates, who elected a Co-ordinating Council and 
employed a General Administrator? 11 There is a spectrum from a diffuse network 
to an established institution. A diffuse network is more subject to change in its 
active participants over periods of a few years, more informal in the exercise of 
leadership, more liable to modify its structure, more variable in the level of its 
activities and more diverse in its range of activities at different times than is an 
established institution. From this perspective, we can define networks in global 
politics as consisting of individuals and NGOs who engage in transnational 
communication about global issues, in diffuse structures with limited hierarchy and 
low institutionalisation. 
 Networks have evoked great interest in the study of non-governmental 
organisations in global politics, but it is not so often acknowledged there are some 
fundamental differences between different networks. In particular, not all networks 
are engaged in joint political action. Five types may be distinguished. Historically, 
there have been the relatively institutionalised international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs), many of which have registered to obtain consultative status 
at the UN. Most INGOs are highly politically active, but some are solely concerned 
with co-operation between their members and choose not to apply for consultative 
status. Some, but not all, of the older INGOs are sufficiently hierarchical, 
                                                 
9  Castells, Vol. I, p. 501. 
10  A. Chetley, The Politics of Baby Foods. Successful Challenges to an International Marketing Strategy, 
(London: Frances Pinter, 1986), p. 71.  
11  Chetley, pp. 101-5. 
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bureaucratic and institutionalised for the term, network, to be inappropriate. In the 
past, the costs of communications were high enough that INGOs were not formed 
unless the need was felt for several areas of co-operation. Now that 
communications are so much cheaper, much looser networks without any 
institutional structure can be created. The simplest form is an information network, 
using an e-mail list server and/or a website to enable its participants to 
communicate about social, cultural, professional, scientific, economic or political 
issues. Administration of such networks may be undertaken by a separate, 
independent NGO, created solely for the purpose of information-sharing, or it may 
be located within a specific, national NGO or an INGO. Usually, it maintains its 
reputation for reliability by not being politically active and not applying for 
consultative status. The focus of the literature in Sociology overwhelmingly has 
been on transnational advocacy networks that are defined in terms of the 
commitment of the members to campaigning, as a diverse coalition, sharing and 
promoting some common values. Issue caucuses are similar, except each of them 
operates solely within a specific global intergovernmental organisation (IGO) and 
they exist temporarily, for the duration of the relevant meetings. The NGO 
participants usually do not maintain any network between sessions and the 
composition of each caucus varies from one session to the next.12 Finally, there 
are governance networks that are designed to facilitate and expand NGO 
participation in policy-making processes. They will be defined, below, as networks 
that do not attempt to influence political decision-making, except on the narrow 
question of participation rights for all NGOs. Although they share with issue 
caucuses the characteristic of being linked to a specific IGO, governance networks 
differ in having some continuity and in not having any common political goals.13  
 The first term, INGO, is in general use and may be applied to any form of 
transnational network that has institutional continuity. The other four types of 
networks have been defined as ideal-types. In practice, within each real-world 
network, transnational NGOs will engage in some mixture of internal co-operation 
to support their members, information-sharing, political advocacy, caucusing and 
governance activities. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the 
categories are fundamentally different from each other. Indeed, to some extent 
they may be incompatible with each other. In particular, activists engaging with the 
UN system have severely damaged their advocacy capabilities by failing to 
                                                 
12  The term, issue caucus, is rarely used in academic work, but is common among transnational activists. 
13  These distinctions were first made in Willetts, 2011, pp. 120-23. 
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recognise the difference between advocacy and governance activities. The 
fundamental contradiction is that advocacy involves competition with opponents 
whereas asserting governance rights involves co-operation with opponents. This 
paper will examine the differing roles of INGOs, advocacy networks and 
governance networks in global intergovernmental organisations. Information 
networks will not be considered further, because they are not the basis for political 
action. Issue caucuses will not be discussed, because their temporary nature, their 
lack of formal membership and their ability to mutate prevents them being a serious 
cause of conflict. In as much as caucuses do gain any continuity, they can be 
considered as advocacy networks.14 Neither information networks nor caucuses 
seek to gain consultative status at the UN.  
International Non-Governmental Organisations 
When does an NGO become an international NGO? The Union of International 
Associations, who publish the authoritative reference work, The Yearbook of 
International Organisations, use a tight definition. For them, an international NGO 
(INGO) must aim to operate, have members and receive substantial contributions 
to its budget from at least three countries. In practice, the majority of INGOs have a 
distinct presence in many more than three countries. On this basis, there are nearly 
8,400 INGOs, with some 1,800 being global INGOs and 6,600 being “regionally 
oriented”.15 From the list of NGOs in consultative status with the UN, it would 
appear that just over half of these global INGOs are registered with the UN.16 The 
INGOs are all, by definition, established institutions. They work through a variety of 
different structures. Some are simply groupings of NGOs from different countries 
that co-operate globally. Where there is a strong collective identity, as with the 
Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), the members are a single national section from 
each country. Where there is a broader common purpose, as with International 
Council on Social Welfare, there can be more than one NGO joining from the same 
country. Some INGOs are themselves formed by INGOs, such as the International 
Social Science Council, which brings together 15 different INGOs for the various 
                                                 
14  We will see that in practice the term caucus may involve confusion between advocacy and governance 
roles. 
15  See for example, Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organisations, Edition 49, 
2012-2013, (Leiden: Brill, 2012) Vol. 5, Figure 2.1. 
16  In 2011, there were 2,562 NGOs in General or Special Status. Deleting national and regional NGOs 
leaves some 500 NGOs. Those on the Roster are mainly regional, but nevertheless there are still some 
450 additional specialist global NGOs on the Roster. Thus, the rough total of 950 non-regional INGOs at 
the UN is about half the number in the UIA Yearbook. (The data is imprecise because of the ambiguities in 
the nature of many of the NGOs.) 
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social science disciplines. Others may be based on more-local groups. For 
example, Rotary International encompasses some 34,000 local Rotary Clubs, 
which have a total of 1.2 million individual members.17 International professional 
NGOs can have two types of members: the International Bar Association has over 
200 national legal associations and more than 45,000 individual lawyers as 
members.18 A significant number of INGOs are composed of commercial 
companies, such as the International Air Transport Association (IATA), or other 
private bodies, such as the International Association of Universities. While there is 
great diversity in the types of members and the purposes of these organisations, 
they all have a clear structure, with a permanent global headquarters and formal 
membership, employing professional staff to run their activities. They are 
established institutions. 
 From 1945 to 1996, there was a clear distinction between international NGOs 
and “national” NGOs that predominantly worked in a single country. Since then two 
processes have blurred this distinction. In 1996, the UN amended its Statute for 
NGOs, to allow national NGOs, including national sections of INGOs, to obtain 
consultative status.19 As a result, several hundred national NGOs have become 
participants in UN policy-making processes. In addition, from the mid-1990s, the 
Internet developed substantially, making e-mail communications and the world-
wide web available to any person or organisation in a large city and increasingly to 
those based in smaller towns as well.20 In particular, the UN has suddenly become 
a highly transparent political system, enabling anyone with access to the Internet to 
follow most of its proceedings and the related documentation, from his or her own 
desk. This has meant that local or national NGOs can now engage in transnational 
activities without having to have substantial resources at their disposal and without 
having to use an INGO as an intermediary. These changes have weakened 
INGOs, to the extent that they are no longer gatekeepers to the lobbying process 
nor the sole source of expertise on the working of the UN system nor the sole 
participants in the system.  
                                                 
17  Rotary International, “About Us”, www.rotary.org/en/AboutUs, November 2012. 
18  International Bar Association, “About the IBA”, www.ibanet.org/About_the_IBA/About_the_IBA.aspx, 
November 2012. 
19  Compare paras. 7 and 9 of ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968 with paras. 4-8 of ECOSOC 
Resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996. Prior to 1996, a handful of national NGOs did gain consultative 
status, but this was explicitly considered to be an exceptional privilege and any requests from national 
NGOs normally were not considered.  
20  The introduction of Android-based smartphones in 2003 and iPhones in 2007 has now extended Internet 
access to virtually all areas of the world. In developing countries users do not need to own such phones, 
as they can be hired for short periods of time. 
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 It would be wrong to deduce there has been an overall decline in INGOs 
relative to national NGOs. Some, such as the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation (IPPF) and the World Federation of United Nations Associations 
(WFUNA), accept some of their affiliates gaining UN consultative status 
independently. However, others, such as Amnesty International, regard their global 
organisation, including all the national sections, as a single coherent organisation, 
with the result that none of their national sections are registered. By their nature, 
the national sections of most INGOs are more locally focused and have little 
reason to allocate resources to work independently at the UN on a regular basis. In 
practice, few of the affiliates of INGOs have opted to have their own consultative 
status. The great majority of national NGOs that are members of an international 
NGO still expect to relate to the UN via this organisation. National NGOs that are 
not members of an INGO are even less likely to have an interest in the UN, unless 
they have a specific transnational focus in their work. The numbers of national 
NGOs that took up the opportunity to gain consultative status grew slowly initially. 
After a decade, by the end of 2005, most countries still had no NGOs at all 
registered for consultative status and the majority of NGOs at the UN were INGOs. 
However, by 2011, over half of all the countries have at least one NGO. There are 
156 national NGOs from the United States, 44 from Canada, 38 from China, 34 
from the UK, 30 from India, 26 from Italy, 24 from Australia, 20 each from Russia 
and Tunisia and just twelve other countries have ten or more. Most countries have 
just one or two NGOs at the UN.21 Thus the registration of national NGOs that 
could theoretically totally overload the working of the consultative arrangements 
has not remotely approached its maximum potential. 
 All INGOs are institutions and most are relatively hierarchical, but even those 
with commercial members are not as hierarchical as individual companies or 
government bureaucracies. Members of most INGOs are free to resign their 
membership, with no threat to their own continued existence as a political actor, if 
they feel there are insufficient benefits from continued membership. The exceptions 
to both these points are the global bodies, with a collective identity that have a 
single national organisation in each country where they work. This applies to 
campaigning INGOs. A national section of Amnesty International or of WWF would 
lose a great deal in terms of public recognition, status and the ability to mobilise 
                                                 
21  The index page, www.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/NGOS/NGO-HOME.HTM, provides access to the UN lists of 
NGOs with consultative status in various years since 2001, (while the UN website only has the current list). 
The data quoted is for 2011. The figures must be taken as being approximate, as they were solely derived 
from the name of the organisation.  
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resources if they were to resign and lose the right to operate under the collective 
name. Similarly, it applies to professional bodies. In 1983 the Soviet Society of 
Psychiatrists and Neuropathologists were forced to leave the World Psychiatric 
Association (because they had collaborated with the detention of dissidents in 
psychiatric hospitals), with the result that they lost their ability to command 
professional respect. It is interesting to note that, for some INGOs, their strength 
with respect to their members, can lie in their status rather than control over 
resources or the provision of services. 
 While the environment for INGOs has changed, the INGOs have also 
themselves changed. They have taken part in the communications revolution. Their 
activities are known to a wider audience of members and non-members than 
previously through their own websites and their publications have a wider 
distribution through Internet sales and Internet downloads. INGOs still provide the 
services that led to them being formed at various points in the last hundred years 
and generally they do so using modern technology with greater efficiency and at 
less cost than in the past. They facilitate communication between their members. 
They collect, analyse, publish and distribute information. They are repositories of 
experience and hence sources for learning and training. They assist and subsidise 
their weaker members. They provide common services, but at a cheaper rate 
through use of their collective bargaining power and the economies of scale. They 
undertake joint projects that, in most cases, the members would not be capable of 
undertaking on their own. They enhance the status of their members through 
association with the wider organisation. They lobby governments and 
intergovernmental organisations to promote the interests of their members. Of 
course, no INGO undertakes all these activities and some do only a few. IATA 
shares information, provides common services to the airlines and is a lobby for 
their commercial interests. IPPF is more focused on sharing experience among its 
members, particularly on a regional basis, and providing resources for their 
members in developing countries. However, like IATA, it is an important 
commercial actor: it pools the buying power of its members, to obtain contraceptive 
supplies. Similarly, it is a major lobby, in promoting family planning programmes, 
both of its members and of governments.  
 In as much as INGOs are hierarchical and are institutionalised, they differ from 
loosely structured networks. In as much as INGOs promote flows of information, 
they are a type of network. When INGOs are solely concerned with providing 
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services for their members and promoting communication between their members, 
they are very different from transnational advocacy networks. However, when they 
are campaigning, running websites, seeking and gaining media coverage, 
mobilising support from their ultimate members (individual people) and organising 
collective action, they are acting in the same manner as transnational advocacy 
networks. A few INGOs identify their primary purpose as being to act in this way, 
with the result that they are both INGOs and transnational advocacy networks. We 
might call bodies such as Amnesty, WFUNA and WWF transnational advocacy 
institutions. They do differ from looser networks, in being more centralised and 
having a formal collective policy, defined statements of their values and a process 
for deciding their political strategy. 
Transnational Advocacy Networks 
The brief period of heightened activism of the anti-globalisation movement from 
1999 to 2001 caught the imagination of the news media, inspired activists, 
intimidated politicians and made the existence of transnational networks evident to 
the general public.22 This stimulated academic work on transnational activism, as 
did pioneering work by Keck and Sikkink.23 They emphasise the mobilisation of 
support for values through targeted campaigns, to influence both policy outcomes 
and the terms and nature of political debate. Keck and Sikkink define a 
transnational advocacy network as “those relevant actors working internationally on 
an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse and 
dense exchanges of information and services”. “They are organised to promote 
causes, principled ideas and norms.”24 This definition is compatible with the more 
general definition of a network offered above. By restricting themselves to 
                                                 
22  If it seems to be exaggerated to suggest politicians were intimidated, consider the extreme security 
measures at the G8 summit in Genoa in June 2001 and the decision to hold the WTO Fourth Ministerial 
Conference in November 2001 in Doha, a place that would be inaccessible to protesters. 
23  M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998). For 
other work on social movements in global politics, see J. Bandy and J. Smith (eds.), Coalitions Across 
Borders. Transnational Protest and the Neo-Liberal Order, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); S. 
Batliwala and L. D. Brown (eds.), Transnational Civil Society, (Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press, 2006); 
M. Edwards and J. Gaventa (eds.), Global Citizen Action, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001); A. M. Florini 
(ed.), The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 
2000); S. Khagram, J. V. Riker and K. Sikkink (eds.), Restructuring World Politics. Transnational Social 
Movements, Networks and Norms, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); D. della Porta and 
S. Tarrow (eds.), Transnational Protest and Global Activism, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); J. 
Smith, C. Chatfield and R. Pagnucco (eds.), Transnational Movements in Global Politics, (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1997); J. Smith and H. Johnston (eds.), Globalization and Resistance. 
Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002); S. Tarrow, The 
New Transnational Activism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and P. Willetts, “From 
Stockholm to Rio and beyond: the impact of the environmental movement on the United Nations 
consultative arrangements for NGOs”, Review of International Studies, 1996, Vol. 22, pp. 57-80. 
24  Keck and Sikkink, p. 1 and p. 8, respectively. 
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advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink also add “shared values” and their 
promotion, as an essential qualification of the type of network they are analysing. 
Their work on advocacy networks is important because it brings together a variety 
of propositions that challenge orthodox theorising about international relations. It 
gives theoretical importance to individual activists and to NGOs. It rejects the 
separation between domestic and transnational politics. It stresses the centrality of 
values, norms and social relations. What is also implied in the empirical work on 
advocacy networks, but is not expressed in theoretical terms, is that 
intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN and the World Bank, are 
significant political systems, generating policy outcomes that have some impact 
throughout the world. 
 The prototype for global advocacy networks was formed two decades prior to 
the rise of anti-globalisation and achieved campaigning successes prior to “the 
information age”. The International Baby Food Action Network was able to mobilise 
healthcare professionals, nutritionists, development activists, women’s groups, 
anti-corporate activists, religious groups and community organisations without any 
e-mails or websites. Individuals could not easily have direct engagement with the 
network, but millions of people were engaged indirectly via the various types of 
NGOs that chose to publicise the question. The significance of the network was in 
making the death of babies, due to bottle-feeding, salient to very different types of 
people for very different reasons via linkages to the values that were most salient 
to each particular NGO. A nurse could take a technical medical view of how to save 
babies’ lives, while a nationalist could denounce the exploitation of developing 
countries by Western companies and a feminist could focus on the right of women 
to be responsible for their bodies and their children’s upbringing. Efficient postal 
services, the new transnational direct-dialling telephone systems and cheap air 
travel established good enough communications to allow a campaign directed at 
the World Health Assembly to achieve the endorsement in May 1981 of an 
International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes. The code, which 
banned public advertising of dried milk and other activities that discourage breast-
feeding, was adopted against the intense opposition of the transnational 
corporations and the Reagan administration in the USA.25 This campaign illustrated 
one of the key theoretical points of the advocacy networks literature. Support for 
highly salient abstract values, such as a baby’s right to life, could be mobilised by 
                                                 
25  For a full account of the campaign and the text of the Code, see A. Chetley, op. cit. 
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supposedly powerless actors, to counter and overcome the economic interests of 
major TNCs and the ideological commitment of a “superpower” government.26 The 
success of IBFAN was followed directly by some of the same actors forming similar 
networks, such as Health Action International and the Pesticides Action Network.27 
 The first step towards the creation of the contemporary advocacy networks was 
learning to use the Internet. However, NGOs were not merely passive adopters of 
a new technology. Because they understood the benefits of creating networks to 
mobilise support and because they recognised the potential of electronic 
communications, NGOs were crucial in the creation of the Internet. Once the first 
personal computers became available, development, human rights, environmental 
and peace groups started networking across several countries. Interdoc was 
formed in 1982 as a private network of 25 development NGOs from around the 
world. PeaceNet was formed in the USA in 1985 and GreenNet was formed in 
Britain in the same year. They were the world’s first Internet service providers. By 
1990 they had established a global network for e-mail and electronic conferences 
and the main NGO communication nodes had formed the Association for 
Progressive Communication (APC). If the key feature of the Internet is its use as a 
communication system for the public, the NGO pioneers were important in 
providing access for the public and in actively developing “gateways” to connect 
the different networks to each other. From 1990 to 1992, during the preparations 
for the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit, the UN used the APC servers to make public 
the documentation for the Summit. Then, the APC provided the first public 
demonstration of the Internet as a tool for interactive political mobilisation, by 
connecting NGOs around the world to the NGOs active in Rio during the Summit. 
Another major innovation was the production by a Canadian NGO of the first 
edition of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin and its posting on the APC servers. This 
enabled daily reporting and commentary on the conference proceedings to be 
available around the world. After the Summit, NGOs became participants in the 
Global Environment Facility and the World Bank used the APC to make GEF 
documentation available. All this was achieved before the first web page had been 
written. NGOs were forming information networks before the World Bank, the UN, 
governments or TNCs had developed any awareness of the potential of the 
                                                 
26  For more on the ability of NGOs to mobilise support for their values, see P. Willetts, “Who cares about the 
environment?”,  in J. Vogler and M. Imber (eds.), The Environment and International Relations, (London: 
Routledge, 1996) and “Understanding the place of NGOs in global politics”, in Willetts,  2011.  
27  Neither HAI nor PAN mobilised the same level of support as IBFAN, but they did have important 
successes. For example, see P. Hough, The Global Politics of Pesticides, (London: Earthscan, 1998). 
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Internet and environmentalists were at the forefront of the learning process. APC 
was not itself an advocacy network. It provided facilities for the creation of 
information networks and to enhance the communication capabilities of advocacy 
networks.28 The desire to form and strengthen advocacy networks was a major 
contribution to the creation of the Internet.29  
 During the 1990s, the main impact of advocacy networks was in the 
environmental policy domain, with the conclusion of eight major multilateral 
agreements: the Framework Convention on Climate Change in May 1992 and 
more importantly its Kyoto Protocol in December 1997; the Convention on 
Biological Diversity in June 1992 and its Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 
January 2000; the Convention to Combat Desertification in October 1994; the 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in August 1995, the Rotterdam Convention on Prior 
Informed Consent for trade in pesticides and other dangerous chemicals in 
September 1998 and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
in May 2001. In addition, there has been a high impact on global policy 
implementation. For example, the Save Narmada Movement mobilised in India 
against the Sardar Sarovar Dam and achieved sufficient global support for the 
World Bank to withdraw its funding of the dam in June 1993. The success of the 
transnational environmental advocacy networks should not be exaggerated. 
Against the list of agreements and policy changes achieved must be set the failure 
to obtain a convention to protect rainforests, due to opposition primarily from the 
Brazilian and Malaysian governments, and the failure to reduce the extraordinary, 
excessive and exceptional utilisation of energy within the USA. Furthermore, the 
new networks were not achieving such successes for the first time. One may note 
that in pre-Internet times international NGOs had achieved similar successes, with 
the negotiation of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands for the maintenance of 
waterfowl habitats in February 1971; the creation of the United Nations 
Environment Programme in December 1972; the negotiation of the Convention on 
the International Trade in Endangered Species in March 1973; the negotiation of 
                                                 
28  As APC had no role in determining the nature of the information transmitted by its subscribers on its 
networks, it was itself neither an information network nor an advocacy network. It was a loosely structured 
INGO offering services to its members and their subscribers. 
29  For a detailed discussion of the contribution by NGOs to the creation of the Internet, see “NGOs, 
networking and the creation of the Internet”, in Willetts, 2011. See also R. Bissio, “Occupying New Space 
for Public Life: Politics and people in a networked society”, in J. W. Foster and A. Anand (eds.), Whose 
World is it Anyway? Civil Society, the United Nations and the Multilateral Future, (Ottawa: The United 
Nations Association in Canada, 1999), pp. 429-58. In 1989, Bissio initiated Chasque, the Uruguayan 
member of APC. For the point that APC was ahead of the World Bank, UNEP and UNDP in using e-mail 
and electronic conferences, see Bissio, p. 434 and for the lead taken by Southern NGOs see pp. 438-9. 
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the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in March 1985 and its 
more important Montreal Protocol in September 1987; the transformation of the 
International Whaling Commission from a commercially oriented organisation to a 
conservation organisation in 1986; the agreement on the Basle Convention on 
Hazardous Wastes in March 1989; and the blocking of exploration for minerals in 
Antarctica in the late 1980s.  
 In the human rights policy domain, there has been a similar pattern of dramatic 
change in the 1990s. The impact of NGOs on the Vienna World Conference on 
Human Rights in June 1993 and subsequently at the Beijing World Conference on 
Women in September 1995 transformed the global human rights discourse by 
integrating women’s rights into human right debates. In particular, violence against 
women was firmly established on the global political agenda. Also at Vienna, NGOs 
overcame the opposition of most governments to the creation of a UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the consequent enhancing of the human 
rights work of the UN Secretariat. Dissatisfaction of NGOs with the operations of 
the Commission on Human Rights and a crucial initiative from the UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, led to the conversion of the Commission into a higher status 
Human Rights Council, meeting more frequently, with a wider mandate to monitor 
the record of all governments, under Universal Periodic Reviews. Large scale 
global advocacy networks have immensely strengthened the ability of NGOs to 
influence the committees monitoring the human rights conventions, notably the 
work of the Children’s Rights Information Network has become central to the 
review of government reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. As with 
environmental advocacy, there have been failures. The record on human rights 
must be set against continued abuse in many countries and the shocking use or 
collaboration with torture by the US administration and European governments in 
the “war on terrorism”. In addition, the advent of modern networking is not as 
significant as the record since 1990 suggests. The major revolution in the global 
politics of human rights occurred earlier, with the completion of the negotiations of 
the conventions against genocide in 1948, on refugees in July 1951, on racial 
discrimination in 1966, on discrimination against women in 1979, on torture in 1984 
and on the rights of the child in 1989. The fundamental shift, from a Commission on 
Human Rights that ignored complaints by individuals and by NGOs, to one that 
considers the governments with the worst records, was initiated with a new 
procedure in May 1970 to examine “consistent pattern of gross and reliably 
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attested violations of human rights”30 and the appointment of the first country-
specific Special Rapporteur in March 1979.31  
 There are lessons from the record on environmental and human rights 
advocacy. Large-scale, effective, global mobilisation does not guarantee success.  
The new global networks are not necessarily more effective than the older 
established international NGOs. The failure to limit destruction of the marine 
environment by Japanese and European industrial fishing, the failure to stop the 
building of the Narmada dams and the failure to end torture, even in Western 
countries, show that it is possible to win the global policy debate, without 
necessarily achieving corresponding policy implementation at the local level. In all 
situations, the impact of networks is affected by the positions of other political 
actors at the global, national and local levels. 
 Global networking on development questions came somewhat later. While 
environmental and human rights NGOs were formed in the nineteenth century and 
there were strong INGOs by the 1950s, development NGOs and INGOs did not 
exist until the 1960s. There was some development-related work by NGOs, in the 
form of health programmes, technical assistance and humanitarian relief during the 
colonial era, but none of this was of sufficient breadth for these NGOs to be 
described as development NGOs.32 In response to decolonisation, some existing 
NGOs and INGOs started to take up development issues. For example, Oxfam and 
CARE were both started as relief organisations at the end of the Second World 
War, but did not become development organisations until the early 1960s. The 
formation of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies in 1962 was an 
example of existing INGOs expanding their scope, by three INGOs concerned with 
migration and refugees merging and taking on development issues.33 Later on, 
new networks with a focus on development were created. The International 
Coalition for Development Action formed in 1976 and the Third World Network in 
1984 were examples of new advocacy networks, but neither went on to seize the 
mobilisation opportunities provided by the Internet. In ICDA’s case, this was 
surprising, as in 1982 they had initiated Interdoc, the first global electronic NGO 
                                                 
30  UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503(XLVIII) of 27 May 1970. 
31  The appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Chile by Commission on Human Rights Resolution 11 
(XXXV) of 6 March 1979, endorsed by ECOSOC Decision 1979/32 of 10 May 1979.  
32  See C. Chabbott, “Development INGOs”, in J. Boli and G. M. Thmoas (eds.), Constructing World Culture. 
International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).  
33  See “A Brief History of ICVA”, www.icva.ch/begin_40.html. Similarly, Oxfam was formed in 1942 as a 
famine relief and refugee NGO and did not take up development until the 1960s.  
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network.34 In TWN’s case, they have always concentrated primarily on their own 
research and advocacy from their headquarters in Malaysia, with less extensive 
operations in a few other developing countries. They have not sought to become 
an interactive network nor to mobilise a wider coalition with a presence in all 
developing countries under their own name. 
 In 1994, the Network for Global Economic Justice, was formed as a coalition of 
over 200 diverse US organisations. It campaigned under the slogan Fifty Years is 
Enough. Some of its adherents saw this slogan as an appeal to have the World 
Bank and the IMF closed down. They were shocked to find strong opposition to this 
radical position from many European and developing-country NGOs, who wanted 
to maintain these intergovernmental institutions but reform their policies.35 A much 
simpler, but also a much more powerful challenge to the existing order arose when 
Christian Aid backed two eccentric Englishmen, who under the slogan Jubilee 
2000 called for the cancellation of all developing country official debt. In May 1998 
they were able to surround the city of Birmingham with peaceful demonstrators, 
when the G8 summit occurred. The campaign became the first of the truly global 
advocacy networks of the Internet era. It not only linked NGOs worldwide as IBFAN 
had, but was able to engage individuals throughout the world in campaigning, 
demonstrating and signing petitions. In due course, massive changes were made 
in the policies of the major aid donors and the IMF and the World Bank, to write off 
bilateral debt and reduce multilateral debt. Other spectacular successes have 
resulted in the abandonment of negotiations to create a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment and forcing the WTO to address the development impact of its policies.  
 Global networks have also had extraordinary success on “high politics” 
questions. The Coalition for an International Criminal Court achieved the 
negotiation of a Statute in July 1998 and its entry into force in July 2002; the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines achieved the Ottawa Treaty in 
September 1997 and its entry into force in March 1999; and the International 
Action Network on Small Arms was able in December 2006 to initiate a process of 
negotiations to regulate the trade in small arms.36 In each case, success was 
                                                 
34  Willetts, 2011, pp. 91-2. ICDA has had a chequered career, sometimes being quite active for a few years 
and sometimes becoming moribund. 
35  K. Danaher (ed.), 50 Years is Enough. The Case Against the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, (Boston: South End Press, 1994) and S. Cleary, “The World Bank and NGOs”, in P. Willetts (ed.), 
‘The Conscience of the World’. The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System, 
(Washington DC: Brookings, 1996), especially pp. 87-9.  
36  UN General Assembly Resolution 61/89 of 6 December 2006, passed by a vote of 153 in favour to one 
against (USA), with 24 abstentions and 14 absent. It is striking that the preamble of the resolution notes 
“the role played by non-governmental organisations and civil society” in the political process. 
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obtained against the sustained opposition of both the Clinton and the Bush 
administrations and their main allies were gradually drawn away, leaving the USA 
in diplomatic isolation. 
 Advocacy networks have adherents who identify with the network by endorsing 
joint statements, but they do not have formal membership. Their image and their 
ideology might give the impression that they are totally non-hierarchical, but they 
must have a minimal structure to be able to operate at all. One person or a very 
small number of people have to raise the funds to keep crucial nodes, such as the 
Association for Progressive Communication, in operation. Key individuals run e-
mail lists or edit newsletters. Vast amorphous global networks still have within them 
small networks of key individuals who know and trust each other, because they 
meet face to face perhaps once a year or at times more frequently. Particular 
NGOs, such as the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 
covering issues at the WTO or the Bretton Woods Project covering the IMF and the 
World Bank or Amnesty International covering human rights issues, are crucial in 
providing detailed, reliable, technical information on global policy-making 
processes and thereby they become gatekeepers for much of the debate within the 
wider networks.  
 Keck and Sikkink laid emphasis on arguing that transnational advocacy 
networks are not new. Transnational co-operation of social movements to change 
government policies goes back at least to the nineteenth century.37 Therefore, 
advocacy networks are not dependent upon the modern technology of the 
information age. The case of IBFAN and the policy revolutions on human rights and 
the environment in the 1970s and 1980s show this point is also valid for 
movements that seek to achieve change at the level of global policy-making in 
intergovernmental institutions. Transnational advocacy networks can move faster, 
gain greater command over information and mobilise a much broader movement 
through modern techniques using the Internet, but electronic communication is not 
an essential feature of a global network. However, the late occurrence of global 
advocacy networks on development questions suggests that the cheap modern 
information technology may have been essential to the participation on an equal 
footing of individuals and NGOs from developing countries.  
                                                 
37  Keck and Sikkink, Chapter 2. 
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Governance Networks 
While both INGOs and advocacy networks focus much of their activities on 
influencing policy-making in intergovernmental organisations, they also have goals 
and related activities that are independent from and external to intergovernmental 
organisations. In contrast, there is another different type of network whose 
operations and indeed their very existence are solely the product of the 
engagement of NGOs with intergovernmental organisations. Their purpose is to 
enhance the participation of NGOs in global or regional policy-making processes. 
Because they focus on procedures, on how decisions are made, rather than what 
the outcomes should be, they are clearly not advocacy networks. For this reason I 
propose a new term, governance networks, to describe them. They may be defined 
as a open group of NGOs acting jointly to claim, assert or maintain their right to 
participate in a specific intergovernmental policy-making forum and/or co-operating 
to enhance the effectiveness of their participation.  
 While particular individuals may acquire special status and assume a leadership 
role in a governance network, these networks are solely open to NGOs. Individuals 
are only members of the network by virtue of their membership of a particular 
NGO. This is because no IGO has yet given access to individuals and IGOs always 
have some form of registration of NGOs and their accredited representatives, in 
order to specify who may and may not be allowed entrance to the buildings and 
attendance at the meetings. The network is defined as being open, in order to 
emphasise that it includes and represents all NGOs, whatever their different values 
may be, if they wish to attend and participate in the IGO. This is crucial to their 
difference from advocacy networks, whose members have some common identity 
and shared values that are being pursued. In contrast, members of governance 
networks do not have any common identity, other than their status as NGOs, nor 
any shared values, other than belief in their common right to participate in the 
political process. 
 A governance network will always be associated with a single IGO or part of an 
IGO. It may be that there are similar memberships and similar practices in different 
organisations or, especially, in different parts of the same IGO, but the governance 
networks will nevertheless be independent of each other. For example, the UN’s 
Commission on Sustainable Development and its Commission on the Status of 
Women are expected to give access to virtually the same set of NGOs and their 
basic participation rights are defined in the ECOSOC Statute for NGOs, which 
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applies to all the ECOSOC commissions.38 However, the CSD NGO Steering 
Committee and the NGO Committee on the Status of Women in practice attracted 
different NGOs and the two commissions developed very different practices, within 
the framework of the Statute, for NGO input to each commission’s work. Thus, 
each of these two NGO committees should be considered as a distinct governance 
network.  
 A governance network is only likely to exist when an IGO has already decided 
to admit NGOs to its proceedings. Even so, NGOs may come together to form a 
governance network at the same time as the governments are forming the new 
institution. For example, since the early 1970s, there has been a general 
presumption that NGOs will participate in a global conferences convened by 
ECOSOC or by the General Assembly. The only debates have been about which 
NGOs will be admitted and what their rights will be. Consequently, NGOs have 
often formed a “Steering Committee” or a “Facilitation Committee” immediately the 
decision has been taken to convene a conference. Such committees then lobby the 
conference secretariat and the preparatory committee in order to ensure the early 
procedural decisions maximise access for NGOs. Similarly, there is a general 
presumption that NGOs are central to global environmental politics. Consequently, 
a governance network will be formed during the process of creating any new 
policy-making body on environmental issues, in order to claim access rights. 
 In any IGO or at any global conference, the network will need to claim rights, if 
access is only given to some, but not all, of the organs or some types of meetings. 
For example, in the UN, the full consultative arrangements only apply in ECOSOC, 
its subsidiary bodies and the Human Rights Council. There have been persistent 
attempts by the Conference of NGOs in Consultative Status (CONGO) to claim 
similar rights in the General Assembly and the Security Council, but these have 
generally been unsuccessful because governments opposed to NGO participation 
have been able to point out that the UN Charter in Article 71 solely refers to 
consultation with ECOSOC. Nevertheless, there has been incremental change, 
with NGOs first gaining access to conferences called by the Assembly and later to 
Special Sessions of the Assembly. In March 2006, for the first time, full 
participation rights were gained in part of the Assembly’s work. When the human 
rights policy-making was transferred from a Commission under ECOSOC to a 
                                                 
38  Both the CSD and the CSW are open to all NGOs granted consultative status by ECOSOC’s NGO 
Committee. However, each in addition is open to a small number of NGOs that attended, respectively, UN 
environmental or women’s conferences, without having obtained consultative status. 
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Council under the Assembly, NGOs were able to insist that all practices for their 
participation in the Commission would be continued in the new Council.39 A 
governance network will need to assert the participation rights of NGOs when they 
are not able to exercise their agreed rights in an effective manner. Sometimes 
simple practical problems, like changing the dates of a session at short notice or 
changing security arrangements for the building, can make it very difficult for NGOs 
to participate. At other times there can be political problems, when the chair at 
particular meetings will attempt to exclude NGOs, without having the authority to do 
so, and protests will be necessary to change the chair’s decision. The network will 
need to lobby hard to maintain rights when events provide an opportunity for 
hostile governments to attempt to revise the consultative arrangements in a 
restrictive manner. For some years, this was the situation in the early stages of 
every new UN conference. The most surprising example occurred in 1990 at the 
first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom I) for the 1992 Earth Summit, when 
sustained argument was necessary to obtain confirmation that procedures used at 
previous conferences would be used again. 
 An ideal-type governance network, (in the sense of the pure abstract concept, 
rather than an average type or a perfect type), undertakes five different kinds of 
activities before the IGO session takes place. Firstly, it initiates the political process 
for the majority of NGOs, by making them aware that an event is going to happen 
and giving them the precise information on how to obtain and exercise the right to 
take part. Since 1946, NGOs that have been granted consultative status by 
ECOSOC have had the automatic right to participate in the work of ECOSOC and 
its subsidiary bodies. In the 1970s, it gradually became accepted that they would 
automatically have similar rights at UN conferences. In the 1980s, it also became 
practice to allow other NGOs to apply for temporary accreditation for a single 
conference. As a minimum, there will normally be a deadline some weeks before 
the event, by which the names of NGOs representatives who wish to attend must 
be submitted. For a new forum, for one lacking a list of recognised NGOs or for 
temporary accreditation, there will be a much earlier submission deadline for each 
NGO to be registered for the event. The network will tell NGOs about the deadlines 
and circulate any application forms, perhaps along with guidance on how to 
complete and submit the applications. In some circumstances, the network will also 
provide information about travel arrangements and about finding accommodation.  
                                                 
39  UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006. 
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 Secondly, the governance network provides information about the 
intergovernmental body equally and publicly to any NGO that is interested. This 
information might cover the history of the body, including its past policies and its 
activities, along with an outline of its structure and its place within the wider 
organisation of which it is part. Such information is essential to any NGO that 
wishes to maintain, to modify or to change the policy of the body. Usually change in 
the world of diplomacy is incremental and it is always based upon an appeal to 
past policies and past practice, as a source of legitimisation, even when radical 
change is being proposed. Knowledge of the history and the context of the 
intergovernmental processes will enable an NGO to build on these precedents, in 
framing its demands, so that support can be maximised.  
 Thirdly, the network will ensure that NGOs understand the formal and informal 
rules of procedure of the body. In particular, there are usually very precise rules 
about when, where and how NGOs may distribute written materials and make oral 
statements. If attempts are made to participate outside the recognised procedures, 
this may not only discredit the individual NGO, but also threaten the status of all 
other NGOs. Fourthly, the network will actively train new representatives not only 
by providing information about the IGO and its procedures, but also about the 
tactics for gaining political influence. In general, it is necessary to present the 
NGOs values and proposals in a language that is appropriate for diplomacy, in a 
style and format that is expected in the specific body, with an emphasise that 
appeals to the decision-makers’ own perspectives and at a point in the 
proceedings before the opportunities for introducing new ideas or new text have 
passed. Perhaps, the most common disappointment for inexperienced NGO 
representatives is to find that they have engaged with a UN conference or a high-
level decision-making body at the end of the political process, when there are few 
possibilities for influencing outcomes. If they had been involved much earlier, at the 
start of the process, in the lower-level bodies, they might have succeeded in 
gaining serious attention for their proposals.  
 Lastly, it is often the case that NGOs from developing countries do not have 
sufficient resources to be able to support the costs of participation in 
intergovernmental policy-making. Even if they have the necessary personnel, the 
cost of travel to and from the UN, along with accommodation and meals in New 
York, may be beyond the capacity of the NGO’s budget. When an event occurs in a 
developing country, local and regional NGOs will find it possible to attend, but it 
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can still be expensive for developing country representatives from other regions. To 
deal with these problems, a governance network will raise funds to support 
attendance from developing countries.  
 When an event is under way, the network will still be providing support to its 
members. Rooms have to be booked for NGO meetings each morning, before the 
official sessions start, and often for each lunchtime and each evening. Locations 
have to be established for the secretariat to provide NGOs with copies of 
diplomatic documents, if possible as soon as they are issued. Arrangements have 
to be made to distribute written NGO materials, even if it is only providing large 
tables in the corridors, where any NGO can display its publications and political 
statements. Procedures have to be suggested and implemented for deciding how 
NGO speakers in the diplomatic forum will be chosen. Often “side events” are 
organised, either under the auspices of the governance network or at the initiative 
of governments, to enable diplomats and NGO representatives to exchange ideas 
and argue points in open, formal, but unofficial, meetings. 
 In addition to the governance functions for formal and informal participation in 
diplomatic proceedings, there may be comparable functions for unofficial events 
that are organised elsewhere in conjunction with the official events. These are 
normally designated as an “NGO Forum”. Facilities are provided for all NGOs to be 
able to make presentations, hold debates, display publicity, sell publications, show 
films or engage in any other activities concerned with the issues on the official 
agenda of the diplomatic conference or the related wider agenda of public debate. 
The Forum may occur in the week before and/or during the same time as the 
official meetings. There will not automatically be a Forum at all diplomatic events 
involving NGOs. Clearly, a Forum will only occur when the issues are salient to a 
large number of NGOs. It is more likely to occur when new issues are being placed 
on the global agenda. Hence, it is more likely at ad hoc global conferences rather 
than regular sessions of global institutions. The Forum may be organised by the 
main governance network. When the events are occurring outside established UN 
centres, such as New York, Nairobi or Geneva, it is likely that a committee of local 
NGOs will do much of the administrative work for the Forum. Often, the UN 
Secretariat and the host government will also provide some assistance. Whatever 
arrangements are used, the organising committee should be regarded as a 
governance network, because the facilities are provided for all NGOs, irrespective 
of their stand on the issues. Indeed, a Forum is open to a wider range of NGOs 
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than those who participate alongside the official proceeding: the Forum is not 
limited to those who have been granted permanent or temporary consultative 
status by the UN. 
 No actual governance network is likely to undertake all the work of the ideal-
type network. Promoting NGO registration will usually be done in conjunction with 
the IGO secretariat. Much of the background information about the IGO will be on 
the IGO’s own official website and the network will need to do little more than 
provide a guide to the website, with links to the essential materials. An effective 
network will often provide information on their own website about procedures. They 
will also organise training sessions, for a few days before the event starts, covering 
both procedures and political tactics. Fund-raising for developing country 
participation, if it occurs, is normally the responsibility of a larger, more wealthy 
Northern NGO and/or, in the case of UN events, the Non-Governmental Liaison 
Service, which is an inter-agency programme of the UN system. Facilities for NGO 
meetings and participation at the event may be provided as a matter of routine by 
the secretariat.  
 There is thus a wide variety to the range of activities and the level of resources 
that a governance network will need at a specific event. In general, regular 
meetings of a long-established body, coming under the auspices of the UN 
ECOSOC, may require quite low effort from the network, for the NGOs to feel they 
have had every opportunity to pursue their political activities. On the other hand, an 
ad hoc UN conference on a new global issue, taking place in a capital city lacking 
an established conference centre, may require an immense effort for fund-raising; 
establishing the new network; obtaining and distributing information; negotiating 
with the UN, the host government and the local NGOs; facilitating participation; and 
running a complex programme of NGO events during the conference.  
The Relationships Between Transnational Advocacy Networks and 
Governance Networks 
For the purpose of academic analysis, there is a clear distinction between 
transnational advocacy networks and governance networks. Modern transnational 
advocacy networks do not have a defined membership. They have adherents, who 
may have formally and publicly identified themselves with the network, but other 
active adherents are not always known to those at the centre of the network. On 
the other hand, governance networks each have a specific list of members, 
whether they are active members taking part in the network or potential members, 
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who have chosen to be inactive. Advocacy networks can often have thousands of 
adherents, because they are open to any global, regional, national or local NGO or 
any individual having access to a personal computer, whereas governance 
networks only involve those with sufficient motivation and sufficient resources to 
attend an IGO meeting, which will not often go above a few hundred NGOs. 
Advocacy networks consist of larger numbers of NGOs, but are more limited in the 
range of their adherents, because of the need to share the network’s values before 
becoming active. Governance networks cover a smaller number of NGOs, but are 
open to any recognised NGO that perceives the work of the IGO to be salient to its 
values. 
 The question of values is the defining difference between the ideal types. In 
practice, adherents of advocacy networks may have some diversity in their values, 
because they approach the same policy question from different perspectives. 
Environmentalists wanting to conserve ecosystems and biodiversity may be 
resistant to change from a conservative perspective or hostile to exploitation of 
resources from a left-wing perspective. Advocates of change in any policy domain 
are frequently divided between radicals wanting rapid and substantial change and 
reformers content with slower, incremental change. Also, in practice, members of 
governance networks may share quite similar values, because the relevant IGO 
has a limited range of activities, which are only salient to those with particular 
values. For example, for most of its first decade, the Global Environment Facility 
NGO Network, encompassing all NGOs accredited to GEF, only attracted activist 
environmentalists. The majority of them shared a wider range of values on popular 
participation, equity and poverty reduction in sustainable development. They were 
somewhat surprised when in 2001 they were joined by representatives from 
indigenous peoples organisations, who were more focused on the status of their 
peoples, but the two sides eventually settled down to effective collaboration.40 
When we move away from the ideal types, advocacy networks containing 
adherents with relatively diverse values and governance networks with relatively 
concordant members are not very different in their degree of unity and cohesion. 
 The central behavioural difference between the ideal-types is that advocacy 
networks mobilise support for common values, while governance networks mobilise 
to enhance participation. Advocacy networks campaign, while governance 
networks administer or debate procedural processes. Again, in practice, the 
                                                 
40  Personal observation by the author at the NGO Network, during GEF Council meetings in December 2001 
and May 2002. 
  25  
difference is not necessarily so sharp. When campaigners cannot obtain 
information from policy-makers or are denied access to decision-making events, 
where they expect to be able to lobby, they will demand participation rights. 
Equally, when those promoting participation meet and find they have a 
commonality of values, they are likely to consider adopting joint statements on 
substantive questions to submit to the policy-making process. There are not many 
questions that are purely procedural: the choice of speakers may be affected by 
what they are expected to say and the allocation of limited funds may be decided 
by substantively-related considerations of who is “most worthy” of support. The 
GEF NGO Network has clear elements of an advocacy network from the 
environmental movement and the human rights advocacy networks are very 
concerned about the consultative arrangements for NGO participation in the 
Human Rights Council, their access to special mechanisms and their general ability 
to present information to the UN. All networks working within an intergovernmental 
organisation or a diplomatic conference are likely to have some desire to campaign 
collectively and some concern with the governance procedures for doing so.  
 The blurring of the boundary between the two types of networks in the real 
world does not mean the distinction between the ideal types is only of academic 
significance and irrelevant to activists. Fundamental problems can arise and result 
in significant political crises, under certain circumstances, when the distinction is 
not respected in practice. On the one hand, an advocacy network could damage 
the participation rights of its own adherents, if it does not recognise the need to 
defend the participation rights of its opponents. On the other hand, a governance 
network risks disintegration if it allows particular NGOs to attempt the advocacy of 
certain values in the name of the whole network. Advocacy networks can operate 
independently as caucuses, perhaps in opposition to other NGOs, when the work 
of both sides is facilitated by a governance network. Conversely, all NGOs need to 
abandon their independence and work with those whose values they do not share, 
when a governance network needs personnel, financial resources or political 
support to overcome any obstacles to the exercise of participation rights. These 
problems will be illustrated from events in the UN system. 
Specific Problems about NGO Participation 
There is one category of NGOs whose legitimacy within the UN system is regularly 
challenged by advocacy networks. When an issue involves whether economic 
activity should be regulated, advocacy networks may deny the right of business 
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international non-governmental organisations (BINGOs) to be participants in the 
policy-making process. On the whole, in the United Nations itself, this does not 
present a problem for governance networks, because it has been authoritatively 
decided who may have participation rights. From the very beginning of the 
consultative arrangements in 1946, non-profit-making commercial associations 
were treated as NGOs, but individual profit-making bodies could not expect to be 
accredited. The early precedents set by ECOSOC have carried through to UN 
conferences. 
 Radical environmentalists, with varying levels of support from other different 
networks, have consistently objected to transnational corporations having access 
to the UN system. The question has arisen on at least three occasions and 
produced rather different outcomes. The first occasion generated some divisions 
among NGOs, but was on the periphery of the UN system. In the run-up to the 
1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, a group of 86 NGOs set up an International 
Facilitating Committee. They were clearly designed as a governance network for 
the Summit: they refused to adopt joint policy statements.41 The IFC sought to 
maximise their networking potential and participation in the summit by bringing 
together representatives of the “independent sectors”, one of which was “business 
and industry”, represented by the Business Council for Sustainable Development. 
Other more radical NGOs formed an alternative International Steering Committee 
to avoid collaborating with business and also to be able to endorse political 
positions. The conflict did not cause damage at this point, because each committee 
concentrated on maximising attendance and activities of their network at the 
summit. Preventing attendance by the BCSD and other business INGOs was not a 
plausible goal for the radicals to pursue.  
 The second occasion arose during the preparations for the next general UN 
conference on environmental issues, the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in 2002. At one point, the Secretariat did introduce three individual 
companies into the list of new, non-ECOSOC NGOs to be accredited to the 
Summit. However, these companies were removed from the list, due to NGO 
action, before the main conference opened.42 The point was decided without any 
controversy, because the ECOSOC rules applied and hence there was consensus 
that, by definition, NGOs at the WSSD could not be profit-making.  
                                                 
41  F. Dodds, “from the Corridors of Power to the Global Negotiating Table: The NGO Steering Committee of 
the Commission on Sustainable Development”, pp. 203-13, in Edwards and Gaventa: cited information 
from p. 204. 
42  For more details, see Willetts, 2011, p.18. 
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 On the third occasion, some NGOs objected strongly to Kofi Annan’s initiative to 
have a UN Global Compact with major companies. This was intended to produce a 
forum for the UN, trades unions and other NGOs to collaborate with companies 
that were willing to commit themselves to the implementation of ten principles of 
corporate social responsibility, in the areas of human rights, labour standards, the 
environment and corruption. In response to the first Global Compact Leaders 
Summit in June 2004, a group of NGOs (mainly environmentalists and women’s 
NGOs) held a counter-summit and signed a joint statement calling for the Compact 
to be replaced by “a legally binding framework for corporate accountability”.43 Their 
protests had been undermined by the participation in the Compact of a few major 
NGOs. The Compact has continued and expanded, but it has not caused any 
damage to the ECOSOC consultative arrangements, because it is totally separate 
from them. It has not raised any conflicts about networking, because each NGO 
can decide independently whether or not to sign the Compact and take part in 
related activities.  
 The situation is different for each of the UN specialised agencies, because they 
are legally independent and decide their own participation procedures. There has 
been great variation in the way in which the agencies handle relations with 
companies. At one end of the spectrum, there is the International Labour 
Organisation, with its “tripartite system”. Each member state has four 
representatives: two from the government, one from the employers and one from 
trades unions.44 This means commercial interests and unions from each country 
each are able to vote in the highest policy-making bodies. In addition to this, 
consultative arrangements (without voting rights) have been established with a 
range of INGOs, including some BINGOs, but mainly unions, professional 
associations, women’s groups, religious bodies and development groups. Most 
specialised agencies consider co-operation with the commercial companies that 
operate in their sector to be essential to their work, but this is not necessarily done 
through formal procedures. For example, neither the World Bank nor the 
International Monetary Fund have official consultative arrangements for the 
meetings of their boards. Nevertheless, NGOs, commercial banks and banking 
associations have close relations with both the staff and the members of the 
                                                 
43  The “Joint Civil Society Statement on the Global Compact and Corporate Accountability” of July 2004 is 
available from www.corporate-accountability.org/news/Global_Compact_Statement-Signed.pdf. It was first 
drafted in New York on 23 June 2004. 
44  For a discussion of hybrid international organisations, that are neither IGOs nor INGOs, see Willetts, 2011, 
particularly pp. 72-80. 
  28  
boards. For NGOs the relationships are stronger with the World Bank and for the 
commercial banks the relationships are stronger with the IMF. In both cases, there 
is relatively easy access to the staff, but access to board members is less frequent. 
Because most meetings are informal and non-routine, with banks and NGOs not 
being in the room at the same time, NGOs do not have to decide whether to 
participate alongside the banks. At the other end of the spectrum from the ILO, the 
WHO has a strong policy of avoiding engagement with commercial interests. This 
includes specifying that all the NGOs with which the WHO has official relations 
“shall be free from concerns which are primarily of a commercial or profit-making 
nature”.45 The policy has not been applied rigorously and a pharmaceutical and a 
food trade association are on the WHO list of NGOs.46 At times there are pressures 
for WHO to have stronger relations with trade associations.47 However, when 
WHO’s Standing Committee on NGOs recommended admission of the 
International Council of Grocery Manufacturers Associations and the Confederation 
of Food and Drink Industries of the EU to official relations with WHO, the Council of 
NGO Representatives succeeded in blocking endorsement of this recommendation 
by the WHO Executive Board.48  
 CONGO, which has a role as a governance network at the UN, faced agonising 
debates in the late 1990s on whether they should support participation rights for 
NGOs to whom the great majority their members are hostile. They were shocked to 
find that opening the consultative arrangements to national NGOs in 1996 allowed 
the National Rifle Association, an influential US gun lobby, to obtain Roster status. 
While many felt the NRA was not a “true NGO”, no action was taken to expel them. 
There is equal hostility to the Unification Church, popularly known as the Moonies, 
which has had at least four front organisations working at the UN headquarters in 
New York. Again the response has been to refuse to collaborate with these NGOs, 
but not to challenge their presence within the UN. Thus, this governance network 
has maintained the principle of accepting participation rights for all NGOs, 
irrespective of their reputation or the values they endorse. 
                                                 
45  Paragraph 3.1 of “Principles Governing Relations between the World Health Organization and Non-
Governmental Organisations”, adopted by the Fortieth World Health Assembly in 1987, as Resolution 
WHA40.25 and available at www.who.int/civilsociety/relations/principles/en/. 
46  “List of 183 nongovernmental organizations in official relations with WHO reflecting decisions of EB130, 
January 2012”, available from a link on www.who.int/civilsociety/relations/en/. 
47  There was a  significant policy review in 2003-2004, but no change resulted in the 1987 “Principles 
Governing Relations” (cited above).  Another review was occurring in 2012, but at the time of writing this 
paper it had not been completed. 
48  The recommendation was in “Report of the Standing Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations”, 
WHO document EB113/23 of 23 January 2004. 
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Table 1  Examples of Networks that have Some Governance Role 
 
 
 
                                                 
49  While most documents refer to the “NGO Planning Committee for the ICPD”, a few individuals have 
described themselves as having been on the International NGO Steering Committee. These two titles 
clearly refer to the same body. 
Intergovernmental Institution 
and Date of Its Foundation 
Governance Network  
and Date of Its Foundation 
Main 
Roles Undertaken 
UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) – 1946 
Conference of Non-Governmental 
Organisations in Consultative 
Relationship with the United 
Nations (CONGO) – 1948 
Defending participation rights and 
facilitating caucusing 
UN Commission on Sustainable 
Development – 1993 
CSD NGO Steering Committee – 
1994-2001 
Providing event information, 
inducting new NGOs and 
facilitating caucusing 
UN Commission on the Status of 
Women – 1946 
NGO Committee on the Status of 
Women (a CONGO committee) – 
1973 
Providing event information, 
facilitating caucusing and 
organising side-events 
Global Environment Facility –
1994 
GEF NGO Network – 1995 Providing event information, 
organising participation and 
facilitating caucusing 
World Bank – 1944, 1960 NGO Working Group on the 
World Bank – 1984 to 1997 
Organising relations with staff via 
a World Bank NGO Committee 
World Trade Organisation – 1995 International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development 
(ICTSD) – 1996 
Providing information on the 
issues, on past events and on 
forthcoming events 
 
Global Conference and its Date 
Governance Network  
and Date of Its Foundation 
Main 
Roles Undertaken 
UN Conference on Environment 
and Development – 1992, 
(PrepCom I, 1990) 
1) International Facilitating 
Committee – 1990 
2) International NGO Steering 
Committee for UNCED – 1990 
3) Brazilian NGOs 
1) Defending participation rights 
and providing event information  
1 and 2) facilitating caucusing 
3) Organising the Forum 
International Conference on 
Population and Development – 
1994 
NGO Planning Committee for the 
ICPD49 
Providing event information, 
facilitating caucusing and 
organising the Forum 
World Conference against 
Racism – 2001 
International Steering Committee  
South African NGO Coalition 
(SANGOCO) – 1995 
Both contributed to organising the 
Forum 
World Summit on Sustainable 
Development – 2002 
1) Sustainable Development 
Issues Network – 2001 
2) South African NGO Coalition 
(SANGOCO) – 1995 
3) International Steering Group – 
March 2002 
1) Providing event information, 
assisting new NGOs, organising 
Multi-Stakeholder Dialogues at 
PrepComs II and IV, facilitating 
caucusing at PrepComs and 
WSSD 
2 and 3) Organising the Global 
Peoples Forum 
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Globalisation and Anti-Globalisation 
So long as the conflict between advocacy networks wanting limited coalitions and 
governance networks wanting to be all-inclusive does not go to the heart of the 
issues being debated, the confusion between advocacy and governance may not 
produce problems. Equally, if there is only a limited range of similar NGOs involved 
in a network, it may be able to pursue both activities without awareness of the 
inherent differences between the two types of activities. Alternatively, at times, the 
structure and the procedures of the intergovernmental organisation will make it 
impossible for a network to influence who should or should not participate. 
However, a period of radical mobilisation at the beginning of the century did show 
how political differences can generate crises for NGO networks that attempt 
advocacy in the name of the whole community of NGOs participating in global 
diplomatic processes. 
 The processes of technical and economic globalisation, which started in the 
1970s, were followed by a communications revolution in the 1990s, which enabled 
NGOs to engage in political globalisation through transnational mobilisation. Much 
of the focus was on the global economic institutions, particularly the World Trade 
Organisation. The political hostility to economic globalisation and to the global 
institutions came to a head in the “Battle of Seattle” in November 1999, when large-
scale demonstrations against the Third Ministerial Conference of the WTO taking 
place in Seattle temporarily closed the streets around the conference building. The 
breakdown in the WTO negotiations that occurred was then falsely attributed to the 
pressure from global civil society. The anti-globalisation movement triumphantly 
continued to mobilise using the Internet and achieved unprecedented large 
demonstrations at the Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank, in 
Washington in April 2000, and at the annual meetings of their boards of governors, 
in Prague in September 2000. The Group of Eight (G-8) meetings of the leaders 
from the world’s largest economies met in Genoa behind a fence that cut off the 
public from the town centre in July 2001. While the April 2001 Bank-Fund meeting 
only faced some 300 demonstrators, a massive confrontation seemed to be 
inevitable for the September 2001 meetings planned to be in Washington. 
Mobilization for Global Justice had successfully built a network of networks, 
encompassing a diverse coalition of anti-debt, pro-development, environmental, 
trade union and anti-capitalist organisations, mainly from the USA, but also 
including several developing country networks. After the terrorist attacks on New 
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York and Washington on 11 September, it appeared that the 2001 Bank and Fund 
annual meetings would be abandoned, but they eventually took place in Ottawa in 
November 2001. Demonstrations did still occur on the streets of Ottawa, but with 
just a few thousand people, mainly from Canadian groups. 
 The following major global conferences adopted a more subtle tactic of being 
protected by geographical isolation. The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, held 
in Qatar in November 2001, was in Doha, a city surrounded by desert, with all 
access being via a single airport, and in June 2002 the G-8 met in the remote town 
of Kananaskis, in Canada. Thereafter, the anti-globalisation movement ceased to 
be able to mobilise very large numbers on the streets when major global economic 
institutions met. Nevertheless, the events of 1999 to 2001 radicalised many 
activists and also produced divisions between them and the reformers. At 
Washington in 2000 and at Genoa in 2001, the main NGO networks issued public 
statements dissociating themselves from the violence of some of the 
demonstrators, causing anger among the radicals.50 At times during the April 2001 
demonstrations, radicals led chanting of slogans denouncing NGOs as 
collaborators with the capitalist system. A substantial impact then followed on 
relations between populist protesters and NGO lobbyists, at the UN in New York 
and at two major UN conferences held in South Africa, during the period when anti-
globalisation activities were at their height.  
Crisis in Sustainable Development Networking at the UN 
The CSD NGO Steering Committee was a governance network that fell apart in 
May 2001 because it could not contain conflicts between reformers and radicals 
and because the radicals wished it to operate as an advocacy network. It had been 
created in May 1994, to organise NGO participation in the UN’s Commission on 
Sustainable Development. This was a new body established in response to the 
appeal by the Earth Summit for the UN to have a high-level policy-making forum to 
ensure follow-up to the summit and monitor progress in implementing the policies 
adopted in Agenda 21. Action by the General Assembly and by ECOSOC led to 
the creation of the CSD, election of its members and the holding of its first 
organisational meeting in February 1993. There were several reasons why NGOs 
would be highly engaged in the work of the CSD. As a subsidiary body of 
                                                 
50  In April 2000, during the demonstrations against the Bank and Fund Spring Meetings, a group of 22 US 
NGOs from the InterAction network wrote a letter to Mr Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, 
dissociating themselves from those in the streets.  In July 2001, Drop the Debt and other British NGOs 
asked their supporters in Genoa not to take part in the main demonstration outside the G8 summit. 
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ECOSOC, the NGO Statute would automatically apply to the Commission. There 
had been a substantial number of NGOs vigorously engaged at Rio and Agenda 21 
appealed for their activities to be carried through to enhanced involvement at the 
UN. The General Assembly endorsed this appeal, when it specified the role of the 
Commission, with language that provided NGOs should “contribute ... to its 
deliberations”, rather than merely be consulted. Most important of all, the 
Commission’s work was to be totally structured around Agenda 21. One of the four 
sections of Agenda 21 covered “Strengthening the Role of Major Groups”, which 
meant nine specific so-called social groups, namely women, children and youth, 
indigenous people, NGOs, local authorities, workers and their trade unions, 
business and industry, the scientific and technological community, and farmers.51 
The NGOs accredited to ECOSOC realised by the end of 1993 that the Major 
Groups would be one of the central concepts used in the CSD’s work and they 
could maximise their participation by organising Major Group activities. 
 At the first CSD session in June 1993, a British NGO, the United Nations 
Environment and Development (UNED-UK) carried out a questionnaire survey of 
the NGOs present at the session, asking what type of organisational back-up they 
wanted to have. The responses predominantly expressed the need for governance 
functions to be met. A separate strand of NGO networking started among the 
NGOs who met in April-May 1994 at a conference in Barbados recommended by 
the Earth Summit, to give more attention to Small Island Developing States. At the 
second CSD session, ten days later, the two strands came together, in what was 
from the beginning a somewhat uneasy relationship.52 It was agreed that a CSD 
NGO Steering Committee would be structured as a multi-dimensional governance 
network: “The activity of this committee would in no sense be one of political nor 
policy representativeness for the NGO community”.53 The Major Groups would 
each appoint two representatives, one from the North and one from the South, 
while regional groups would also have one representative, on the Steering 
Committee. The result was an institutionalised division between a Northern 
Clearinghouse and a Southern Caucus, which each provided a Co-Chair for the 
overall Committee. Initially the Committee was felt to be highly successful, as in 
                                                 
51  The names of the Major Groups are taken from the headings of the chapters of Section III of Agenda 21. 
In UN terms, the list is rather bizarre, because the nine Major Groups, which could only be admitted to the 
UN as NGOs, included NGOs as one of the nine. In practice, this has been useful, as the NGOs Major 
Group acts as a residual category for any NGOs not in one of the other eight groups. 
52  For more details, see Dodds, p. 205. 
53  “CSD NGO Steering – Committee Terms of Reference”, 26 May 1994, at www.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/ 
NGOS/CSD/ TERMSREF.HTM, quote from point 9. 
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collaboration with the Commission it developed new modes of participation, notably 
from 1997 there were Major Group Dialogue Sessions. NGOs were given the floor 
at the start of the session to make presentations and to answer questions from 
government delegates on the main agenda topic for each year.  
 Although the Steering Committee had been defined as having a governance 
role, during the CSD sessions, the NGOs collectively tried to act as an advocacy 
network, forming positions by consensus: “political representatives or interventions 
will remain the domain of the entire NGO and Major Groups community”.54 Due to 
the time taken in trying to reach consensus among all the NGOs, it was decided to 
operate in more specialised issues caucuses. They also had to have co-chairs, one 
each from the North and the South, and to be represented on the Steering 
Committee. Inevitably the caucuses were smaller, which made the problems 
somewhat more manageable, but it did not resolve the dilemma of what to do when 
there were value differences preventing a consensus. The problem became explicit 
when the co-chairs of one caucus put out a position paper, listing organisations 
that had endorsed it, although they had not seen the paper. This led to the creation 
of a set of Guidelines for the Steering Committee, emphasising its role as a 
governance network rather than an advocacy network.55 It provides that 
“Documents and prepared verbal statements commissioned by caucuses must be 
submitted to the members of the caucus after each substantive revision, and their 
views must be incorporated into the final draft.  Minority positions if any of caucus 
members must be represented in the document.”56 
The text appeared to resolve the tensions – between being all-inclusive, speaking 
with one voice, and having advocacy caucuses – by saying dissent would be 
legitimate. 
 However, the tensions continued to increase at the end of the 1990s. The 
structure was artificial and implied that the members of the Committee were 
representatives of different interests rather than sharing a common interest in NGO 
participation. There was not necessarily equal Northern and Southern engagement 
in each caucus, yet equal participation was expected. Personal animosities 
between the Northern Co-Chair, Felix Dodds, and the Southern Co-Chair, 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55  The story is told by Dodds on pp. 205-06, but he does not give details or a date for the incident. It would 
appear that on p. 205 he erroneously suggests that “Guidelines” had been agree in May 1994, when the 
document agreed then was the “Terms of Reference”, cited above. On p. 206, he indicates discussions in 
1997 (rather than 1994) led to the drafting of the “Guidelines”, cited below, one of which covered “Caucus 
Membership and Representation”.  
56  A revised version of the Guidelines, dated December 1999, is given at www.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/ 
NGOS/CSD/GDLNS-99.HTM. The quoted text is given as having been agreed on 30 April 1998, at CSD-6.  
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Esmeralda Brown, supported by her partner Waldaba Stewart, caused 
disagreements in Committee meetings. The animosities were not solely personal. 
The Northern Clearinghouse had a greater ability to raise funds from official donors 
than did the Southern Caucus. As a result, there were fraught arguments about 
use of financial resources, with accusations of corruption being thrown around. 
Dodds was highly committed to a technocratic, multi-stakeholder dialogue 
approach to environmental policy-making, while Brown and Stewart were 
committed to a populist rhetorical style. Some of the other NGOs were not 
sympathetic to either approach, as each side was in its own way making a false 
claim that an apolitical consensus encompassing the whole network could be 
developed. Increasing rivalries between the two sides led to each trying to win 
control of the governance network processes to isolate the other side. What 
became the fundamental unresolvable problem was that each side wanted to claim 
to speak for the whole NGO community, when there was no reason to expect they 
could be united on the complex environmental issues. The very structure of issue 
caucuses and Major Groups simultaneously implied differences between these 
components of the governance network, and differences on the cross-cutting 
North/South dimension. Yet the differences based on agenda questions, social 
groups and regional areas did not allow space for the fundamentals of politics. 
There were no caucuses based on advocacy of common values. 
 By the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the Johannesburg World 
Summit on Sustainable Development held in New York in May 2001, it had become 
plain that many NGOs were totally disillusioned with the CSD NGO Steering 
Committee. A group of four NGOs announced they would operate through a new 
Sustainable Development Issues Network (SDIN) to organise input to the 
PrepComs and the Summit. The four were the Northern Alliance for Sustainability 
(ANPED), the Environment Liaison Centre International, the Third World Network 
and the Danish 92 Group and they received immediate support from all the NGOs 
that had a serious commitment to influencing the policy-making process. The 
previous Steering Committee continued to operate as a hollow shell of a network, 
under the leadership of the Southern Co-Chair.57 They claimed SDIN was a 
Northern group that could not legitimately work with Southern NGOs. However, the 
claim did not damage SDIN, because nobody would challenge the credentials of 
                                                 
57  Richard Jordan did agree to serve for a while as a Northern Co-Chair, in place of Felix Dodds, but he was 
not the leader of a major NGO and did not have standing as an activist in the sustainable development 
NGO community. 
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TWN as one of the leading authentic voices from the South and it was fully 
committed to SDIN. One of the defining principles of SDIN was that it would not 
attempt to speak on behalf of the whole network. In the Johannesburg process 
SDIN regularly publicised position papers of various NGOs and groups of NGOs, 
but it never endorsed them itself. By adopting this policy, SDIN was able sustain 
vigorous and diverse NGO input to the Johannesburg Summit and the old Steering 
Committee was marginalised.58 
 All the NGOs who chose to participate in the CSD had a commitment to 
sustainable development, which is defined at the UN as being based on three 
pillars, economic development, social equity and environmental protection. 
Consequently, they shared many values and had more in common than civil 
society as a whole. This enabled the CSD NGO Steering Committee to survive for 
a significant period of time nominally being a governance network, while containing 
pressures to become an advocacy network. It lasted seven years. Personal 
rivalries, funding problems and political styles were the immediate cause of the 
network ceasing to operate, but such factors would have had much less impact 
upon a pure governance network. In addition, the differences between a populist 
rhetorical style and a commitment to multi-stakeholder dialogues did embody 
substantive political differences. It was because SDIN avoided attempts at 
collective advocacy and facilitated diverse coalition-making by NGOs that SDIN 
has been more successful, experiencing less tensions and lasting longer.  
Crisis at the World Conference Against Racism 
When the anti-globalisation movement was at its height, the UN convened a 
conference in South Africa that served to link local anti-globalisation passions to 
the global movement. The result was that the World Conference Against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR), which took 
place in Durban from 31 August to 8 September 2001, became the most 
controversial UN conference ever held. Several strong social movements in South 
Africa felt their hopes for change, with the end of apartheid, had been betrayed by 
the African National Congress government adopting neo-liberal economic policies. 
Their main grievances concerned unemployment and poverty, continuing gross 
inequality between blacks and whites, the rights of landless people and 
privatisation of public services, particularly water supplies. Although South Africa 
                                                 
58  For background information on SDIN, see “The SDIN Vision: A Short Glimpse into History” at http://sdin-
ngo.net/about/sdinhistory.php. 
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has not itself been directly subject to IMF structural adjustment programmes, 
solidarity with the rest of Africa and awareness of the impact of such programmes 
led the local social movements to see the global economic institutions as agents of 
“global apartheid”.59 These attitudes spilt over into hostility to the UN and to 
international NGOs, when radical demands – for reparations or at least an apology 
for slavery; denunciation of colonialism as a crime against humanity; and payment 
of compensation by transnational corporations for their exploitation of apartheid – 
were rejected by the WCAR. The hostility of South African civil society to 
globalisation set the context for the engagement of global civil society with the 
Durban conference.  
 An NGO Forum, in the standard format, was organised for the WCAR by the 
South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), on behalf of an International Steering 
Committee (ISC). It met for five days, with three days before the official 
proceedings and a two-day overlap. Then those registered by the UN could lobby 
the government delegates. At the Forum, victims groups from around the world 
engaged in intense debates with national and international NGOs. In addition, 
some 40 caucuses drafted statements to contribute to an NGO Declaration and 
Programme of Action, which Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and Secretary-General of the conference, had promised she would present 
to the diplomats and politicians during the official proceedings.  
 SANGOCO had links to many of those involved in South Africa’s social 
movements, but it refused to follow them in criticisms of the South African 
government and the UN conference. The result was the social movements held a 
set of alternative conferences and workshops at other venues in Durban. They saw 
themselves as following the precedent of the first World Social Forum in Porto 
Alegre, Brazil, in January 2001, which had been organised as an anti-globalisation 
event, in opposition to the élite World Economic Forum in Davos. The Landless 
People's Movement, the Palestinian Solidarity Committee, the Concerned Citizens 
Forum, forerunner of the Anti-Privatisation Forum, and the South African branch of 
the Jubilee South anti-debt movement, all operated under the heading of the 
Durban Social Forum. These local movements were joined by anti-globalisation 
activists among the NGOs from other countries. Although individual people could 
and did involve themselves in both forums, for the first time at a UN conference 
                                                 
59  The term “global apartheid” is used frequently in Bond’s book analysing the global links of South African 
social movements: P. Bond, Talk Left, Walk Right. South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms, (Pretoria: 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2nd ed., 2006). 
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there was a clear division between insider and outsider activities, with two separate 
civil society processes.  
 SANGOCO felt caught in the middle. Munnik and Wilson, two South African 
activists and analysts, observed that SANGOCO was accused by the radicals of 
failing to use the opportunity “to create a wider united front … by linking the front of 
NGOs against racism to debt and the marginalisation of minorities around the 
world”. Yet the radical “ ‘social forum’ forces used official [UN and SANGOCO] 
channels to mobilise – and then challenged the legitimacy of those channels”, and 
“bitter fighting erupted between South African and international organisers”.60 By 
the end of the NGO Forum, the different approaches were very evident. Reformist 
insiders were busy lobbying diplomats and working on the NGO Declaration, while 
the South African social movements organised an anti-government, anti-UN march 
of some 20,000 people, with some support from the more radical of the foreign 
NGO visitors. A rival anti-racism demonstration on the next day, organised by the 
pro-government, ANC Alliance, including the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), had less that 10,000 marchers. There had become a complete 
overlap between South African domestic politics and the global politics of 
responses to globalisation. 
 Although there was a gulf between the SANGOCO NGO Forum and the Social 
Forum, there were still deep divisions within the NGO Forum. This meant the 
attempt by the International Steering Committee to act as a governance network 
was going to be swamped by others who wanted to capture the NGO Forum as an 
advocacy network. In addition, utter confusion of the thinking by the ISC and 
SANGOCO could only lead to conflict, as was shown beforehand by briefing 
materials for potential participants. 
“The purpose of this Forum is to provide civil society with a space of its own to 
present perspectives on the themes of the Conference, establish consensus on 
proposals, strategies and priorities to convey to the Conference … 
The NGO Forum is a favourable space for civil society organisations seeking to 
create an impact in the process of the World Conference. It is an opportunity to 
express the proposals of civil society relating to the needs and visions that the 
peoples wish to channel to their governments and the international community. 
The NGO Forum is not just an event but also a process, oriented to building the 
participation of civil society, and encouraging national, sub-regional, regional and 
sectoral processes, that allow for the expression of as many voices as possible. In 
                                                 
60  V. Munnik and J. Wilson, The World Comes to One Country. An Insider History of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, Johannesburg 2002, (Johannesburg: Heinrich Boell Foundation Southern 
Africa Office, January 2003), p. 29, where comparisons are made between the WCAR and the WSSD.  
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this way, each organisation, process, movement or entity can participate according 
to their field of interest.”61 
The explicit goal of trying to “establish consensus on proposals” implied a 
declaration could be drafted with the agreement of all NGOs. The references to 
“the proposals of civil society” and “the needs and visions” of “the peoples” implied 
there would be common values. On the other hand, encouraging “the expression of 
as many voices as possible” implied a diversity of perspectives and values. There 
was no possibility such a formula could work with the diverse range of groups 
present at a global conference involving such contentious issues. In particular, 
allowing each “victim group” to make its own contribution gave a superficial 
impression of equality of respect for all NGOs and openness to all ideas. However, 
this formula assumed that NGOs supporting different parties to a conflict could 
recognise their opponents as victims. To make matters worse, groups were also 
encouraged to bring text prepared before the Forum. Such text was thus drafted 
without influence from most other members of the Forum. 
 The planned procedure was to have many caucuses and “Thematic 
Commissions” working two hours each afternoon for four days, from 28 to 31 
August, followed by a three-hour morning plenary on 1 September to endorse the 
drafted texts.62 These plans were supposed to provide time for the NGO 
Declaration to go forward to the WCAR at an early stage of the conference. While 
eight hours might be enough for some small caucuses to reach agreement, the 
idea of stitching all the contributions together with many hundreds of participants in 
a three-hour plenary was totally unrealistic. In practice, a long, tense and angry 
debate continued over the whole of the last day and into the night. The outcome 
was a document with an ambiguous status. On the one hand, it appeared to be 
endorsed by all the NGOs as “the outcome of an international process before and 
during the NGO Forum of the WCAR”. On the other hand, it did not receive the 
endorsement by each NGO of each paragraph, because it was “based on the 
understanding that it reflects the regional processes and that the voices of the 
                                                 
61  While these quotes were taken from “A Primer on The UN World Conference Against Racism … NGO 
Parallel Conference” produced by one regional NGO network, ISIS International-Manila, it is safe to 
assume they copied these words from SANGOCO materials: see www.hurights.or.jp/wcar/E/doc/ 
other/WCARPrimer.htm. 
62  Details of the plans were given in the ISIS “Primer”, cited above. 
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victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance must  
be heard”.63 
 At both the diplomatic conference and the NGO Forum, the most divisive issues 
were how to affirm the rights of the Palestinians, how to describe Israeli policy and 
whether anti-Semitism should be taken as encompassing both Jews and Arabs as 
victims. The governmental delegations of the USA and of Israel withdrew in the 
middle of the WCAR, in protest at some of the suggestions being made, but the 
European Union subsequently ensured that no description of Israel as a racist or 
apartheid state was adopted by the official conference. The two paragraphs on 
Palestine repeated standard diplomatic language on recognising the right of the 
Palestinians to an independent state and the right to security for Israel. Attempts to 
change the meaning of anti-Semitism were rejected, but it was bracketed with 
Islamophobia and there was joint condemnation of “racism and discriminatory 
ideas against Jewish, Muslim and Arab communities”.64  
 These issues were handled very differently at the NGO Forum. Text drafted by 
Palestinians and their allies detailed a long list of Israeli repressive practices 
against Palestinians and calls were made for the delegitimisation of Israel and “full 
cessation of all links” with Israel. Nevertheless, no explicit position was taken on 
whether Israel should be absorbed into a Palestinian state or whether there should 
be a two-state settlement.65 The Declaration asserts “a basic ‘root cause’ of Israel’s 
... acts of genocide and practices of ethnic cleansing is a racist system, which is 
Israel’s brand of apartheid”. Overall, there were 28 mentions of apartheid or racism 
as descriptions of Israel and one paragraph called “for the reinstitution [sic] of UN 
resolution 3379 determining the practices of Zionism as racist”.66 While there was a 
brief statement that “Anti-Arab racism is another form of anti-Semitism”, a section 
on anti-Semitism used the conventional meaning and fully condemned all forms of 
anti-Jewish practices. It expressed alarm at “Holocaust denial and Holocaust 
revisionism, Holocaust trivialisation, Holocaust minimisation and by the channelling 
of racist rhetoric and calls to violence on the Internet”. It recognised Jewish people 
                                                 
63  The two quotations are from two sentences placed above the title to the “WCAR NGO Forum Declaration”, 
dated 3 September 2001, see The Hurights Osaka website of the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information 
Center, at www.hurights.or.jp/wcar/E/doc/ngofinal.doc. 
64  “Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (updated 31 January 2002)” – the official declaration, 
paras. 63 and 151 on Palestine and paras. 61 and 150 on anti-semitism, from a link on www.un.org/ 
WCAR/coverage.htm. 
65  Forum Declaration, sections on Palestine, paras. 160-65 and 418-26, with further mentions elsewhere. 
66  Forum Declaration, paras. 98-99, 160, 162-4, 419-22 and 424-6. The reference to UN General Assembly 
Resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, which had determined that “zionism is a form of racism and 
racial discrimination” was in para. 419. The word “reinstitution” refers to the fact that it had been revoked 
by Resolution 46/86 of 16 December 1991. 
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are “targets of threats and acts of violence in countries around the world, and 
documented overt acts of anti-Semitic harassment and vandalism”. The 
Programme of Action also included two long paragraphs proposing measures to 
counteract anti-Semitism.67 The text alone does not convey why many were so 
outraged by the results of the NGO Forum. The arguments and behaviour of the 
anti-Israeli activists were so aggressive and intimidating that the very purpose of an 
anti-racism conference were being denied and many thought the members of 
Jewish NGOs were in physical danger.68 
 The day after the Forum closed and the day before the NGO Declaration was 
released, members of the Eastern and Central Europe NGO Caucus met and 
produced a statement saying they “do not support the documents allegedly 
adopted by the NGO Forum”, because  
“the process of compilation and adoption … was neither transparent nor 
democratic and permeated with procedural violations. The draft documents were 
not submitted to the delegates in a timely manner; the rules of procedure were 
unclear and repeatedly changed; the discussion was heavily restricted. Finally, the 
delegates were not given an opportunity to vote on the draft documents in their 
entirety. This enables us to affirm that the documents cannot be considered 
adopted by the NGO Forum and are not consensus documents.” 69 
There was not unanimity, so the statement was not issued in the name of the 
Caucus, but endorsed separately by “delegates of 36 NGOs from 19 countries”. 
Other NGOs quickly announced that they agreed with this statement, so it was 
opened up to NGOs from countries in other regions and after two days it had been 
endorsed by a total of 77 NGOs from 37 countries. A press conference was held by 
five major NGOs, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, to say 
that they could not accept parts of the Declaration and a member of the ISC 
resigned in protest at the Forum process.70 A radical activist from the US, who 
                                                 
67  Quotes from Forum Declaration, paras. 46, 77 and 78 and the proposed measures in paras. 248-9. 
68  There are surprisingly few accounts of NGO activities at the WCAR. Most are primarily focused on Israeli-
Palestinian antagonism: see D. Matas, “Civil Society Smashes Up”, September 2001, at 
www.hri.ca/racism/analyses/matas.htm, and a more detailed account by H. O. Schoenberg, “Demonization 
in Durban: The World Conference Against Racism”, American Jewish Yearbook, Vol. 102, 2002, pp. 85-
111. An analysis from the perspective of a US left-wing radical is given in E. Mann, Dispatches From 
Durban, (Los Angeles CA: Frontlines Press, 2002). A wider perspective is taken in G. McDougall, “The 
World Conference Against Racism: Through a Wider Lens”, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 26, Issue 
2, 2002, pp. 135-51.There was also a critical ANC report, “Evaluating the WCAR NGO Forum (and 
preparing for the World Summit for Social Development)”, available at 
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pubs/umrabulo/umrabulo13l.html, as of 12 November 2002. 
69  The text is available from European Roma Rights Center website at www.errc.org/popup-article-
view.php?article_id=242  and the Internet Centre Anti-Racism Europe, “Live Reports, Monday September 
3rd, sixth day”, www.icare.to/wcar/monday03.html. There was also a report  from News24, a South African 
on-line news service, “NGO declaration divides delegates - 3 September 2001”:  a copy is available at 
www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/NGOS/WCAR/NEWS0309.DOC. The latter two sources have further details 
about NGO dissatisfaction with the adoption of the documents.  
70  For more details, see both McDougall and Schoenberg. McDougall specifies “some NGO participants” 
resigned from the ISC, but she only names one person: see p. 146 and the corresponding notes.  
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objected to the positions taken by these established international NGOs, also said 
the Declaration “was the product of an unrepresentative and flawed process 
whereby more than 90 percent of the NGO delegates played virtually no role in 
writing, discussing, or voting on it in any manner”.71 When the NGO Declaration 
was made public, Mary Robinson intervened to say “for the first time, I can’t 
recommend to delegates to pay close attention to the document like I normally 
do”.72 Nevertheless, a representative from the ISG presented the NGO Declaration 
to a plenary meeting of the WCAR on 5 September and over three days 106 NGO 
representatives took the floor, including 21 each speaking in the name of a 
different caucus from the Forum.73 
 The lesson from these events is that the ISC and SANGOCO caused a major 
crisis by departing from their governance role, going beyond facilitation of the 
participation by all the diverse range of NGOs. The attempt to produce an NGO 
collective statement by consensus was an attempt to turn all the participants into a 
single advocacy network. It must be assumed that on controversial issues there 
can never be a consensus across the whole of global civil society: indeed, a 
moment’s reflection, demonstrates that this judgement is no more than a simple 
tautology. The problem is more fundamental than is suggested by the criticisms 
from the dissenting NGOs. Even if there had been a transparent process, with 
efficient management of documents, rapid translation into the main languages, 
clear procedural rules and much more time for the debates, the NGO Forum at the 
WCAR still would not have been able to have produced a legitimate common 
statement. There can be no legitimate decision-making process among NGOs 
when consensus does not exist. The claim for “an opportunity to vote on the draft 
documents” cannot be met by any global civil society forum. It is not possible to 
answer the questions of who should have a vote, to what extent does every NGO 
represent a defined constituency, what defines a “true” NGO, how the voting of 
very large NGOs can be balanced against those of very small NGOs, and how the 
differential extent of each NGO’s involvement with the issues can be weighted. 
                                                 
71  Mann, p. 111. 
72  McDougall, p. 151, note 54, quoting a Durban newspaper report, in the Daily Mail and Guardian, 30 
August 2001, from http://www.mg.co.za/mg/za/racism.html, which is no longer available. For more details 
on Robinson’s position, see “Personal report from the meeting of UN HCHR, Ms. Robinson, with the NGO 
International Steering Committee (ISC), on the 6th September 2001”, available at 
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73  In UN document A/CONF.189/12, Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, it says the “Both the Declaration and Plan of Action were presented 
at the plenary of the World Conference on 4 September 2001” (Annex V, para. 2). However, in the main 
part of the Report, the NGO presentations are given as having occurred on 5-7 September, starting with a 
representative from the ISG (Chapter III, paras. 43, 46 and 48-9).  
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Many such questions would be raised by the simple choice on whether one vote 
should be given to each NGO representative or to each NGO. All the conflict and 
the bitterness could only have been avoided by recognising that no consensus 
could exist. Then various competing statements could have been circulated, with 
their sponsors only claiming to speak for those who chose to sign each statement. 
Table 2 Key Events in the Three Governance Crises 
Crisis at the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
Exactly one year after the WCAR, another global summit was convened by the UN 
in South Africa, but this time in Johannesburg rather than Durban. The World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) occurred from 26 August to 4 
September 2002, as a follow-up to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.74 The NGOs 
operating at the Commission on Sustainable Development in New York started 
their preparations for the WSSD with a roundtable meeting hosted by the Danish 
92 Group in Copenhagen in June 2000, six months before the site of the 
                                                 
74  For a variety of perspectives on the events covered by this section, see T. Bigg, “The World Summit on 
Sustainable Development: An assessment”, available on the International Institute for Environment and 
Development website, at http:// pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G02353.pdf; Bond, (cited above), Chapter 7, “The 
‘W$$D’: Pretoria meets its match”; Esmeralda Brown, “The Southern Caucus WSSD Evaluation”, at 
www.southngocaucus.com/goto/WS; C. Death, “Troubles at the top: South African Protests and the 2002 
Johannesburg Summit”, African Affairs, 2010, Vol. 109, Issue 437, pp. 555–574; Mondli Hlatshwayo, “The 
Genesis of the Social Movements Indaba”, Wolpe Lecture at the University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for 
Civil Society, 22 November 2006, at http://amadlandawonye.wikispaces.com/Genesis+of+ 
Social+Movements+Indaba,+Hlatshwayo,+Wolpe+Lecture,+UKZN; Munnik and Wilson, cited above; and 
A. La Viña et al, Making Participation Work: Lessons from Civil Society Engagement in the World Summit 
for Social Development, (Washington DC: World Resources Institute, October 2003), available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/wssd_final_paper_ wri.pdf.  
 A wide range of primary sources on both official and civil society WSSD activities is available at a UN 
website, www.johannesburgsummit.org, and an International Institute for Sustainable Development 
“Linkages” portal www.iisd.ca/wssd/portal.html, but not all the links on the latter site are still active. 
 For the Southern NGO Summit, see materials at the www.southngocaucus.com website. In particular, the 
“Algiers Declaration” is at .../media/Html/ALGIERS_DECLARATION.htm. 
Event Dates Location 
WSSD PrepCom I 
CSD NGO Steering Committee collapses 
 
30 April to 2 May 2001 
 
New York 
NGO Forum (for WCAR) 28 August to 1 September 2001 Durban 
World Conference Against Racism  31 August to 8 September 2001 Durban 
WSSD PrepCom II 28 January to 8 February 2002 New York 
Southern NGO Summit 16-17 March 2002 Algiers 
WSSD PrepCom III 25 March to 5 April 2002 New York 
WSSD PrepCom IV 27 May to 7 June 2002 Bali 
Global Peoples Forum (for WSSD)  24 August to 3 September 2002 Johannesburg 
World Summit on Sustainable Development 26 August to 4 September 2002 Johannesburg 
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conference had been decided by the UN General Assembly. On the presumption 
that it would be held in South Africa, a variety of South African NGOs, all 
associated with SANGOCO, started planning in September 2000 to hold a South 
African Forum for the WSSD – note the title used at this stage.75 They established 
contact with the NGOs in New York and sought to learn from Brazilian NGOs, both 
those who had organised the forum at the Rio Summit and those behind the World 
Social Forum.76 They also sent representatives to the first PrepCom for the WSSD 
in New York at the end of April 2001 and made a good impression with those 
whom they met.77 
 In June 2001, SANGOCO again created a Civil Society Secretariat (CSS), but 
delegated the responsibility to one of its members, the Rural Development 
Services Network (RDSN). The Secretariat was seen as having a dual function. 
Firstly, it was to mobilise South African civil society in a Civil Society Indaba, They 
established a council consisting of five representatives each from eight social 
groups, plus one representative each from the nine provinces, with the aim of 
feeding South African social movement policy positions to the WSSD preparatory 
processes and the summit. In the period from December 2001 to April 2002, the 
different sections of South African civil society entered into intense conflict, along 
basically the same dividing lines as at the WCAR. COSATU and other allies of the 
government denied the Indaba had any legitimacy. They were able to create a new 
Management Committee for the CSS, consisting of a coalition of ANC Alliance 
organisations. The Indaba responded by renaming itself as the Social Movements 
Indaba in March 2002 and announcing it would not engage with the Forum.78 It 
then took a “dramatic turn to the people” and talked of “the hoax of the W$$D”, 
which was promoting the agenda for privatisation and globalisation.79 Some 
organisations left the Indaba in protest at its break with the government and with 
the Forum. During the WSSD, matters came to a head in the most public manner 
possible. As had happened in the previous year at the WCAR, on 31 August 2002, 
there were two rival marches, from a poor township to the conference centre. Again 
the numbers supporting the social movements, in the “anti-WSSD march” 
                                                 
75  Munnik and Wilson, p. 18. 
76  In addition, a paper was commissioned from a leading think-tank, the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED): Tom Biggs, How did NGOs organise for UNCED? Reflections on 
the experience of the Brazilian NGO Forum, cited by Munnik and Wilson, p. 18, but no longer available. 
77  Personal assessment by the author, who was present. 
78  “CS Indaba walks out of WSSD NGO forum”, Civil Society Indaba, press release, 19 March 2002, cited by 
C. Death, p. 561. 
79  Munnik and Wilson, p. 31. Note that, as cited above, Bond, a radical, academic and activist, generally 
converted the initials WSSD to W$$D. 
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organised by the Indaba, were substantially greater than those supporting the ANC 
Alliance, in the Forum march.80 The government attempted to avoid a repetition of 
the low support for the Alliance march during the WCAR, by having their counter-
march organised in the name of the Forum. Ironically, this only served to increase 
the numbers at the Indaba’s “autonomous march”. The government’ reputation 
among the visiting NGOs had been severely damaged by heavy forceful policing of 
peaceful demonstrations, including arrests and use of stun grenades and rubber 
bullets, with the result that many of the people who might have gone on the Forum 
march chose to go on the Indaba march. In addition, even SANGOCO itself “pulled 
out of the Forum march at the last moment, declaring that the ANC was 
manipulating the gathering”.81 
 The second function of the of the Civil Society Secretariat was to organise, at 
the Nasrec exhibition centre, the normal jamboree of non-official events for NGOs 
from around the world. The NGO forum was soon re-labelled in a non-proprietorial 
and more radical manner, as a Global Peoples Forum. The early work was 
required at the same time as SANGOCO was being overwhelmed by its 
responsibilities for the WCAR. It was also permeated with the same confused 
thinking. Initially, both the Indaba and the Forum were planned by CSS to be all-
inclusive advocacy networks and the CSS were expecting, via the Indaba, to 
determine outcomes at the Global Forum. Even in preparatory meetings of civil 
society in other parts of Africa, the South Africans came to be resented for seeing it 
as their Summit. They showed insensitivity in the labelling of a document taken to 
PrepCom IV with the title the South African Civil Society Declaration for Bali, and of 
a document prepared for the WSSD Forum, entitled the South African Civil Society 
Nasrec Declaration.82 Even more damaging, the anti-government rhetoric of the 
social movements led to SANGOCO ousting the head of RDSN from the 
Secretariat.83 As a result of the early conflicts causing the preparations to be 
neglected, for a while, there were even doubts whether the Forum could still take 
place. Just four months before it was due to open, a COSATU leader, Bheki 
                                                 
80  The label “anti-WSSD march” was used by Bond, see p. 140. 
81  Bond, p. 138. 
82  Munnik and Wilson report the discontent of other Africans on p. 36. They also say that the South Africans 
had been advised, during a trip to Brazil, “to prepare a policy discussion document on South Africa’s vision 
for the Global NGO Forum”, p. 18. However, it seems the South Africans misinterpreted the call for an 
organisational policy as being a call for substantive policy. The Declaration for Bali is available at 
www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/NGOS/WSSD/SACSBALI.HTM. The introduction to the Nasrec Declaration 
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83  A. Stoppard, “Infighting Hampers Forthcoming UN Summit”, Inter-Press Services,  Johannesburg, 18 
March 2002, at http://ipsnews2.wpengine.com/2002/03/politics-south-africa-infighting-hampers-
forthcoming-un-summit/. 
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Ntshalintshali, had to convene a meeting at the final UN PrepCom to say 
preparations were “back on track” and to deny the Forum would be “government-
led”.84  
 There was also dissatisfaction with the Forum being held over 20 kilometres 
from the official WSSD in Sandton (requiring 40 minutes travel time) and the 
imposition of a high cost fee of $165 for registration at the Forum.85 Nevertheless, 
some 25,000 people registered and many managed to participate at both Nasrec 
and Sandton. In addition, the Social Movements Indaba (SMI) and the Landless 
People’s Movement held their own forum-type events near to Nasrec; a People’s 
Environment Summit was held in a school; a Summit of Indigenous Peoples took 
place a week earlier in Kimberley; special cultural events occurred at an Ubuntu 
Village and on water issues at the Waterdome; the World Conservation Union 
(IUCN) ran an Environmental Centre at Sandton; there was an International 
Science Forum; and a symposium of leading writers on globalisation occurred at 
the University of the Witwatersrand. Finally, there was a vigorous NGO presence at 
Sandton. However, the main conference centre was not large enough. A fortnight 
before the WSSD opened, the UN Secretariat reported that 11,000 representatives 
had already been accredited. As Sandton's overall capacity was 6,000 people, 
there had to be daily passes, limiting access.86 Transport problems, congestion 
and security were time-wasting. Afterwards, the World Resources Institute reported 
“a sense of isolation due to inadequacies in the participation process” and “a 
certain fragmentation stemming from the very diversity of civil society groups in 
attendance”.87  
 At Rio an International Steering Committee had been established by the 
international NGOs at a very early stage and it had collaborated well with the 
Brazilian NGOs who organised the Forum. For the WSSD, the processes were 
very different. Due to the level of conflict, both within the CSD NGO Steering 
Committee and within South African civil society, there was no leadership and 
preparations at the international level started very late. The International Steering 
Group (ISG) did not have its first meeting until PrepCom III, in April 2002 and its 
                                                 
84  “NGO Forum for Johannesburg Back on Track, Say Organizers”, of 11 April 2002, at 
www.worldsummit2002.org/texts/ SACSPoliticalDeclarationBali.rtf, from the UN, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development, website, "Johannesburg Summit 2002". 
85  Munnik and Wilson, p. 55, quote a registration fee of $150, but the UN report of 11 April 2002, cited above, 
had a figure of $165. Protests led to its waiver for South African participants and presumably to the 
reduction to $150 for foreign participants. 
86  R. Jordan, “Summary of WSSD Briefing, 14 August”, at www.iisd.ca/wssd/news.html#14aug. 
87  La Viña et al, p. 16. 
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composition was not finalised until PrepCom IV, in June 2002. It was created 
mainly by the Civil Society Secretariat co-opting foreign NGO leaders. Munnik and 
Wilson say it “ended up being dominated by the familiar figures from the Southern 
caucus”.88 As members of the CSD NGO Southern Caucus had made contact with 
South Africans when they attended the WCAR, four members of the Caucus, 
including two of their key leaders, Esmeralda Brown and Gordon Bispham, did 
become members of the ISG. Nevertheless, the ISG also included the “CEO” and 
another member of the CSS, plus representatives from COSATU and SANGOCO, 
two of the NGOs organising SDIN and the President of CONGO.89 Consequently, it 
too contained significant divisions.  
 Much of the normal governance work outside the UN prior to the Summit, 
expected of such an ISG, was undertaken by Danish 92, the Ford Foundation and 
the Heinrich Böll Foundation. They supported capacity-building in the South, 
organised caucuses and workshops, provided information services and funded 
attendance by hundreds of civil society representatives, mainly from rural and other 
grassroots communities.90 Another group, Eco-Equity, brought together a 
formidable range of well-known international NGOs, mainly having environmental 
concerns.91 This network provided information and promoted discussions, so they 
made some contributions to governance. However, their prime focus was on 
lobbying to influence the text of the Summit documents, so they are best regarded 
as an insider advocacy network. As was noted above, at the UN PrepComs, the 
governance function of organising NGO participation was undertaken by the UN 
Secretariat working with the four main NGOs that had created SDIN. They 
co-ordinated the preparation of Major Group position papers, but they refused to 
meet the UN’s request to select the representatives to speak at the multi-
stakeholder dialogues, held at PrepCom II and PrepCom IV.92 In the New York 
preparatory process and in the activities at the official Summit, SDIN, Danish 92 
and the Stakeholder Forum For Our Common Future adopted governance roles. 
On balance, SDIN did more work on facilitating participation at the UN meetings, 
                                                 
88  Munnik and Wilson, p. 55. 
89  For the ISG membership, see A Sustainable World is Possible. Outcomes of the Global Peoples Forum at 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development, p. 132, (herafter, GPF Report), available at 
www.southngocaucus.com/Media/EDocs/ Sustainable_World_is_Possible.pdf 
90  La Viña et al, p. 6. 
91  The members of Eco-Equity, as given on their website, were Consumers International, the Danish 92 
Group, Earthjustice, Friends of the Earth International, Greenpeace, Northern Alliance for Sustainability, 
Oxfam International, and Worldwide Fund for Nature. For information about their activities, see 
http://practicalaction.org/wssd_reports. La Viña et al, p. 18, also included Eurodad as an Eco-Equity 
member. 
92  Munnik and Wilson, p. 46. 
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including organising briefing meetings each morning. The other two did more to 
ensure information about the WSSD processes was widely distributed and to assist 
less experienced NGO representatives to understand conference diplomacy. 
 Unlike at the WCAR, the WSSD Forum did produce a set of political positions, 
agreed by consensus.93 This outcome might appear to be contrary to the central 
proposition of this paper that a governance network cannot also be an advocacy 
network. However, the Global Peoples Forum did not represent a full cross-section 
of the NGOs involved in the politics surrounding the Summit. At one end of the 
spectrum, the radical anti-globalisation social movements had largely adopted an 
outsider strategy and distanced themselves from both the Summit and the Forum. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the reformers – who were willing to act as 
insiders – worked within Eco-Equity or SDIN and concentrated on lobbying at the 
Summit. This left the Forum predominantly consisting of those making the 
demands of some developing country nationalists. They expressed some 
opposition to globalisation and the policies of the IMF, the World Bank and the 
WTO, but did not totally reject the capitalist system nor call for the institutions to be 
disbanded. In particular, the Forum outcome documents generally accepted the 
most controversial political development at the WSSD, namely the promotion of 
partnerships with the private sector for sustainable development projects. The 
Forum took general positions on the major issues, but had minimal engagement 
with the crucial debates about specific policy questions. In a judicious analytical 
report, the World Resources Institute concluded “Given the sheer diversity of civil 
society organizations active in sustainable development, perhaps a major parallel 
event during an official meeting is no longer an effective way of organizing 
stakeholder engagement in global processes”.94 
 Thus the International Steering Group did not adopt the normal governance role 
associated with such a designation. The ISG used the Global Peoples Forum as a 
mega advocacy network, but it was not the only advocacy network active in 
Johannesburg. Eco-Equity and the Social Movements Indaba were rival advocacy 
networks. These three networks were more in sympathy with each other at the 
WSSD than they might otherwise have been, because almost all NGOs reacted 
with anger against the positions taken by the US delegation within the conference 
and the behaviour of the South African government, especially the police, outside 
the conference. SDIN remained as a governance network. It survived without any 
                                                 
93  GPF Report, cited above. 
94  La Viña et al, p. 39. 
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crises around its activities, because it rarely took a collective position other than on 
NGO and Major Group access to and participation in diplomacy on sustainable 
development issues. The successful basis for the distinction between governance 
and advocacy was demonstrated by the Third World Network, which was both a 
major contributor to the governance activities of SDIN and, acting independently, 
was an important advocacy network within the Summit.95  
Conclusion 
It has been clearly established that transnational advocacy networks are not the 
only types of global networks. Analytically we may distinguish three ideal types: 
INGOs, as formal, structured institutions, providing services for a defined 
membership; transnational advocacy networks, as diffuse unstructured open 
networks, with adherents promoting a common set of values; and governance 
networks, as structures open to a universe of NGOs accredited to an 
intergovernmental organisation, promoting the global public good of 
democratisation of global policy-making. In practice, a particular network may 
combine features of more than one of the ideal types. An INGO only becomes of 
real significance as a participant in global politics when it moves beyond providing 
services for its members and undertakes some of the ideal-type activities of 
advocacy or governance. However, the defining features of transnational advocacy 
networks and governance networks are in principle contradictory.  
 Any network that combines both advocacy and governance activities runs the 
risk of losing its legitimacy if and when it reaches the position that it must choose 
which activity has priority. Experience suggests straightforward policy 
recommendations, in order to avoid facing such a legitimacy crisis. Two simple 
procedural rules must be obeyed by NGO networks.  
1) No statement advocating particular values or substantive policy positions 
should be issued in the name of any NGO that has not explicitly 
endorsed the joint statement. The safest position is that at least one 
authorised representative of each NGO should endorse the final written 
version of an agreed text, before it is publicly announced that they 
support the statement. 
                                                 
95  The arguments in this paper could also be modified and extended to criticise the use of Major Groups and 
stakeholder forums in UN environmental processes. The WRI considered these to have been a failure at 
the WSSD: see La Viña et al, “Inadequate Mechanisms for Participation”, p. 19-20, and “Lessons from the 
Shortcomings”, pp. 35-8. 
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2) No activities to claim, exercise or maintain general rights of participation 
in an intergovernmental organisation should be undertaken in a manner 
that aims to privilege or to disadvantage a sub-group of NGOs, based on 
the values they advocate. There can be exceptions to this rule where 
there is near global consensus on a value, such as refusal to accept 
NGOs that condone violence as a political tactic. Equally, there can be 
exceptions, by imposing simple objective criteria on what will be 
accepted as an NGO, such as being in existence for at least two years 
and being non-profit-making. Otherwise, the activities will aim to promote 
a generalised, abstract set of long-term participation rights for all NGOs 
that have applied or might apply for accreditation to the 
intergovernmental meetings. 
These two rules are essential for the maintenance of cohesive networks, obtaining 
and expanding participation rights and maximising the impact of advocacy, at the 
United Nations or in other intergovernmental organisations.  
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